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The purpose of this thesis is to identify the optimal characteristics of a terrorist 
deradicalization campaign. A deradicalization campaign consists of all efforts a state or 
organization leverages to prevent the rise of or to disrupt terrorist organizations. A 
persistent difficulty in evaluating deradicalization “programs” stems from conflating 
different levels of analysis ranging from individual in-jail programs to broader national 
campaigns. The primary scope of this research extends to identifying key programs or 
factors required for state-run deradicalization campaigns to be effective. The initial 
framework used to evaluate these campaigns is composed of four lines of effort (LOE):  
individual disengagement, collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, and 
collective deradicalization. A series of mechanisms operationalize each LOE. This 
framework will be applied to historical and ongoing deradicalization efforts in Algeria, 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Indonesia in order to develop relevant, empirically-based 
conclusions.   
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A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the optimal characteristics of a terrorist 
deradicalization campaign. A deradicalization campaign consists of all efforts a state can 
leverage to prevent the rise of or to disrupt terrorist organizations.1  As discussed in the 
literature review, a persistent difficulty with evaluating deradicalization “programs” 
stems from conflating different levels of analysis ranging from individual in-jail 
programs to  broader national campaigns.  
The primary scope of this research extends to identifying key programs or factors 
required for state-run deradicalization campaigns to be effective. The framework used to 
evaluate these campaigns is composed of four lines of effort (LOE):  individual 
disengagement, collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, and collective 
deradicalization. A series of mechanisms operationalize each LOE. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Said Ali al-Shihri spent six years at Guantanamo Bay as a prisoner and was sent 
back to Saudi Arabia as a repatriated militant in November 2007. After ten weeks he was 
released from the Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Centre for Care and Counseling. By 
2009, he was in Yemen and served as the leader of the Al-Qa’ida cell that claimed 
responsibility for the attempted airline attack in the United States on Christmas Day 
(Goldman, 2010). Was al-Shihri an anomaly after going through such elaborate re-
education training?  Or, does his case represent a more systematic problem with 
                                                 
1 The authors define a deradicalization campaign as a broad set of deradicalization efforts. Recent 
radicalization programs are limited to in-jail and/or detainee-based initiatives. Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & 
Boucek (2010) claim that successful deradicalization programs are broad, rigorous, and comprehensive 
efforts that oppose the “affective, pragmatic, and ideological commitment” (p. xvi) to the group. To be 
effective, these programs require three components: employed interlocutor(s) that are viewed as credible in 
the eyes of the rehabilitated individuals; assistance to ex-militants and their families in finding 
employment, housing, health care, and education; after-care programs that continue monitoring 
rehabilitated extremists in order to deter recidivism and support social integration. This thesis will attempt 




deradicalization campaigns that could be addressed to improve their effectiveness?  His 
completion of the Counseling Program and subsequent return to violence demonstrates 
the utility of exploring the effectiveness of deradicalization campaigns.  
Simply put, an effective deradicalization effort is vital to suppressing future 
terrorist activities. Recognizing the inherent potential for terrorist recidivism, 
deradicalization campaigns are necessary in order to prevent attacks by a large pool of 
experienced insurgents and combatants. In other words, states need to consider how to 
efficiently deter future enrollment in radical groups, continue disrupting existing groups, 
and enable deradicalization of terrorists who have already disengaged from violent 
activity. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What constitutes an effective deradicalization campaign?  In particular, the 
authors analyze if an optimal combination of individual and collective programs can be 
determined in order to reduce terrorism. In addition, we intend to examine how the 
components of effective deradicalization campaigns can be used to understand why and 
how terrorist groups can be induced to deradicalize by answering the research question. 
Within the methodological framework, the authors define four lines of effort 
(LOE):  individual disengagement, collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, 
and collective deradicalization. Additionally, the following nested questions guide the 
research: 
• Are certain LOEs more or less effective by themselves? Given resource 
scarcity, which LOEs are essential? 
• Are combinations of LOEs optimal? If so, what is the optimal 
combination? 
• To what degree do cultural, environmental, or cultural conditions matter? 
D. RADICALIZATION 
The literature on radicalization can be broadly categorized into two approaches 
where one focuses on individual factors and the other on collective factors. Early 
literature argued that political terrorists were driven to commit acts of violence as a 
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consequence of psychological forces tied to a unique “psycho-logic” that allowed these 
individuals to justify perpetrating seemingly random acts of violence (Post, 1998, p. 25). 
In addition to trying to identify a common psychological profile for terrorists, a large 
debate existed centering on socio-economic factors that drove individuals towards 
terrorism. Common conditions were fraternal deprivation,2 poverty, lack of employment, 
or lack of education. 
A common misconception is that radicalization is an individual phenomenon 
triggered by a variety of socio-economic conditions. For example, one idea is that 
poverty leads to terrorism because young men who are poor become angry and easily 
radicalize to commit acts of terror. However, extensive field research has been conducted 
to gather empirical data, which has led to socio-economic theories being refuted (Horgan, 
2005; Moghaddam, 2004; Post, 2007; Sageman, 2004). These conditions are important 
factors, but they are not sufficient to cause radicalization. 
More importantly, the key ingredient is not even an individual’s material status or 
hierarchical rank within the organization. Rather, it is the collective identity of the 
terrorist group. Individuals begin the process, wittingly or not, because of the innate 
human need for collective identity. An individual may have grievances about his socio-
economic position, but grievances will not exclusively lead to radicalization. It is the 
combination of grievances and a lacking collective identity that lead an individual to 
accept a group’s radical moral code. It is after this willing acceptance that an individual 
graduates to adopting a radically deviant belief structure that guides his own thoughts and 
actions. 
While one cannot downplay free will or discount the role of the individual, there 
is growing emphasis on the enormous role that group dynamics play in the radicalization 
process. More specifically, the notion of collective identity has emerged as a primary  
 
 
                                                 
2 Moghaddam (2006) defines fraternal deprivation as relative deprivation that an individual feels 
because of their group’s position in society (p. 22). 
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force that pushes individuals to accept violence and to conduct terrorism as a means to fix 
socio-economic grievances (Horgan, 2009; Moghaddam, 2006; Post, 2007; Taylor & 
Lewis, 2004). 
On the other hand, the second approach puts more emphasis on how collective 
dynamics are more responsible for radicalization. Collective identity should be viewed as 
an organizational adhesive that not only establishes and maintains the ideological norms 
and values for the group, but also serves as a powerful force that compels group members 
to take action. Collective identity is succinctly described as: 
a description of the group to which individuals belong, which serves as the 
normative backdrop against which they can articulate their unique 
attributes…collective identity is primary. The collective identity of a 
terrorist organization describes the group’s beliefs, values, attitudes, and 
goals. Moreover, it specifies the routes an individual might take to 
internalize the values and achieve the goals. The individual terrorist now 
has a template against which to formulate his or her own personal identity. 
(Taylor & Lewis, 2004, pp. 171–173) 
Related to collective identity, the Social Network Theory of radicalization posits 
that the Global Salafi Jihad is an emergent quality of the informal tie formed by alienated 
young men who become transformed into fanatics (Sageman, 2004). Within this theory, it 
is argued that relative deprivation, religious predisposition, and ideological appeal may 
be necessary, but they are not sufficient conditions for terrorist activity. Social bonds are 
the critical element to the process (Sageman, 2004).  
Conceptually, collective identity and social networks appear to be analogous to 
push/pull factors.3 A group’s collective identity—in addition to the strong sense of 
purpose and meaning accompanying this identity—pushes behavioral norms to individual 
members and elicits within each member a sense of duty to take action on behalf of the 
group. Concurrently, strong social bonds and relationships often pull individuals into the 
group and pave the way for dynamic socialization processes and collective identity to 
influence and shape the behavior of all members. 
                                                 
3 In Leaving Terrorism Behind, Tore Bjorgo (2009) first introduces the concept of “push and pull” 
factors. The authors apply the concept differently when compared to Bjorgo’s application. 
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E. DERADICALIZATION VS. DISENGAGEMENT 
Before one can analyze deradicalization, it is important to understand the 
difference between deradicalization and disengagement. The distinction is necessary to 
identify what objectives should be pursued when a campaign tries to reverse 
radicalization. Disengagement defines the process involving a “change in role or function 
that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation” (Horgan, 2009, 
p. 152). Disengagement aims to separate individuals or groups from violent behavior. 
Deradicalization is the “social/psychological process whereby an individual’s 
commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that 
they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity” (Horgan, 
2009, p. 153). Deradicalization looks to change the ideology or beliefs that fuel violent 
behavior. It also refers to initiatives aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist recidivism. 
Ashour (2009) identifies three types of deradicalization: comprehensive, 
substantive, and pragmatic (p. 6). Comprehensive deradicalization refers to a successful 
deradicalization process at all three levels (ideological, behavioral, and organizational).4 
Substantive deradicalization achieves success at the ideological and behavioral levels, but 
not at the organizational level. This is typically caused by splits, fractionalization, 
internal organizational conflict and/or marginalization of deradicalized group leaders. 
The third type, pragmatic deradicalization, refers to success at the behavioral and 
organizational levels only (Ashour, 2009, p. 6). 
While the above definitions and concepts complement each other, they lead to a 
potentially critical analytical flaw within the literature. Existing works on 
deradicalization implicitly and explicitly subscribe to multiple levels of evaluation such 
as individual, collective, and national efforts. This is problematic because without a 
common unit of analysis it is hard to adequately distill common components for an 
                                                 
4 Ashour (2009) defines three fundamental levels of deradicalization. The three levels are ideological, 
behavioral, and organizational. The ideological level aims to change the attitudes of armed Islamist 
movements toward violence. The behavioral level occurs when groups abandon the use of violence in 
pursuit of political goals. Deradicalization at the organizational level results through the “dismantlement of 
the armed units of the organization, which includes discharging/demobilizing their members without splits, 
mutiny, or internal violence” (Ashour, 2009, p. 6).  
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effective campaign. Additionally, many authors interchangeably use disengagement and 
deradicalization; in doing so, they confuse the reader while increasing the degree of 
ambiguity. This confusion also obscures how to define prescriptive measures clearly 
Understanding the difference between deradicalization and disengagement 
illustrates that states have different mechanisms to stop violence on different levels. As 
part of a campaign to stop terrorist/extremist violence within its borders, states can aim to 
deradicalize terrorists, disengage terrorists, or both. With this in mind, states have at their 
disposal a variety of deradicalization and disengagement mechanisms that target 
individual terrorists and terrorist groups. These mechanisms are ingredients that can be 
used in varying combinations to create different campaigns.  
Groups usually do not deradicalize first and then disengage from violence. 
Additionally, disengagement has the ability to facilitate deradicalization. Hypothetically, 
a group may agree to disengage due to terms of a cease-fire. The rank-and-file then return 
to their normal lives and, assuming all belligerents adhere to the cease-fire, the cease-fire 
continues indefinitely. It is possible due to the prolonged period of disengagement that 
members of the group may see the ideological benefits of abstaining from violence, 
which, in fact, demonstrates deradicalization. 
F. DERADICALIZATION 
Much like the literature on radicalization, deradicalization and disengagement can 
be understood at the individual and collective levels. At the individual level, Horgan 
(2009) provides a comprehensive analysis of individual profiles associated with 
deradicalization and disengagement. His findings are quite striking, as there are no 
“cookie-cutter” solutions to the processes of disengagement and/or deradicalization. The 







standardized solution. Horgan used empirical data from interviews with terrorists in order 
to develop a Pathway Model.5 Armed with this model, those seeking to deradicalize 
individuals can customize the process. 
The recent body of literature on deradicalization follows state-level initiatives to 
ideologically moderate imprisoned radicals. Limited success at the individual level 
revealed that it might be more effective to target the collective causes of radicalism vice 
the individual causes. This led to research on targeting the group instead of the 
individual. Collective deradicalization rarely occurs and is extremely difficult, which is 
why some experts suggest that government deradicalization policies should focus on the 
individual terrorist rather than the group (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 109).  
Some stark criticisms can be made regarding this body of literature. Unlike the 
literature on radicalization, which suggests that collective efforts heavily influence the 
individual, the literature on individual deradicalization states the very opposite—the 
deradicalized terrorist only affects himself. In sum, the majority of literature on 
deradicalization fails to properly consider the influence of collective factors on 
radicalization. Another glaring criticism of the literature is that it fails to emphasize the 
need to channel individual deradicalization efforts toward terrorist group leaders due to 
the massive amounts of influence and prestige leaders possess within the group. 
On the collective side, early terror-related academic literature almost entirely 
dismisses the feasibility of collective deradicalization, and instead discusses the need to 
implement measures that favor counterterrorism and anti-terrorism.6  Allusions made by 
                                                 
5 Horgan’s (2009) Pathway Model consists of the dynamic relationship between seven variables: Pre-
radicalization, Radicalization, Pre-Involvement Searching, Violent Radicalization, Remaining Involved and 
Engaged, Disengagement, and Deradicalization (p. 151). 
6 Post (1998) almost entirely dismisses the feasibility of effective terrorist deradicalization; he feels 
“terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up 
terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being” (p. 38). Post also mentions that the 
strong sense of collective identity provided by the group leads to the survival of the group becoming 
paramount. Ultimately, Post favors counterterrorism through the reduction of external support to terrorist 
organizations, and anti-terrorism by marginalizing the attraction to terrorist groups by alienated and/or at-
risk youth. Moghaddam (2006) provides four potential policy implications that contribute to the discussion 
about anti-terrorism: (1) Prevention First; (2) Contextualized Democracy; (3) Educate Against Us-Versus-
Them; and (4) Dialogue. 
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Gurr (1998) and Hoffman (2006) slowly begin to bridge the gap toward a more 
comprehensive understanding of collective deradicalization. Gurr (1998) does not 
provide a compelling argument for or against collective deradicalization, but does list 
three processes that may contribute to the group’s internal decision to contemplate and/or 
initiate steps toward deradicalization: backlash, reform, and deterrence. These processes 
contribute to the overall discussion about collective deradicalization because they erode 
the political and social bases of popular support for terrorist organizations. Like Gurr, 
Hoffman emphasizes the importance of taking a collective approach to combating and/or 
countering radicalization as he states, “a bridge needs to be found between mainstream 
society and these militants so that they do not feel threatened and forced to withdraw 
psychologically into aggressive defensive stances used to justify violence” (p. 128).  
Current terrorism research suggests that collective deradicalization, though harder 
to accomplish, is the most effective method of ending violence and countering Islamist 
extremism (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). Rabasa et al. (2010) argue that 
state efforts need to focus on collective deradicalization, but must also include individual 
deradicalization programs. The most widely acclaimed research on collective 
deradicalization uses case studies to suggest causal relationship between four variables 
and the success of collective deradicalization (Ashour, 2009). It should be noted, 
however, that this research is still in its infancy and lacks adequate depth and breadth 
supported by empirical data. 
In summary, the analysis of the literature suggests that experts now agree on the 
important role that collective identity plays in the radicalization process. Early theorists 
tended to explain radicalization as an individual process by using various psychological 
models. As the study of terrorism has matured, experts placed more emphasis on group, 
organizational, and social psychology to explain the radicalization process (Moghaddam, 
2004; Post, 2007). 
Following 11 September 2001, an increase in the number of detained/imprisoned 
radical Islamists prompted certain governments to moderate radicals by implementing 
numerous programs. Accordingly, scholarly research shifted toward explaining the 
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individual deradicalization process in order to help optimize states’ efforts. In short order, 
the leading terrorism experts began studying and writing about the futility of individual 
deradicalization and suggesting that collective deradicalization was the answer for ending 
violent extremism. At this point, the momentum toward collective deradicalization 
solutions seems stymied because of its inherent difficulty to not only conceptualize, but 
implement it as well. 
G. RESEARCH ARGUMENT AND SUPPORTING HYPOTHESIS 
In their study of deradicalization, Ashour (2009) and Rabasa et al. (2010) have 
identified that measures aimed at the collective, or those which have an effect upon the 
collective, have greater and longer lasting results when it comes to the cessation of 
violence. This is due to the group and social factors that have bound individuals of 
terrorist groups together in the first place. 
Rabasa et al. (2010) acknowledge that individual deradicalization and individual 
and collective disengagement are part of the overall solution, however, they place more 
emphasis on collective deradicalization as it provides more “bang for your buck” in terms 
of permanently ending violence. History has shown that collective measures are more 
permanent than individual measures. Libya, Egypt, and Algeria all serve as examples of 
successful collective deradicalization (Ashour, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2010). In each of 
these cases, the groups that collectively deradicalized have in fact refrained from violence 
since their deradicalization. 
Collective deradicalization occurs less frequently than collective disengagement 
because it requires a significant amount of time, patience, and persistence to change the 
ideology at the individual and group level. In some instances, collective disengagement 
can occur immediately because of a cease-fire agreement or an overwhelming amount of 
state repression in which the majority of the group is detained or killed. 
The examples of collective deradicalization in Libya, Egypt, and Algeria took 
years to accomplish (Ashour, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2010). In each of these cases, most of 
the members of the groups had been captured and imprisoned for long periods of time. 
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The leadership then chose to deradicalize. This decision was followed by a discussion(s) 
with their members in order to convince them that deradicalization was the right path. 
These actions took a great deal of time to complete, indicating that deradicalization is an 
extremely painstaking, methodical process (Ashour, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2010).  
In this thesis, one argument is that efforts aimed at collective deradicalization 
have the greatest effect based on group/social factors that bind individuals together. In the 
case study analysis, mechanisms that facilitate collective deradicalization or attempt to 
influence the group will carry more weight. Countries that use more collective 
mechanisms will likely rank higher in their overall deradicalization effectiveness 
(assuming that these particular mechanisms are being used effectively and efficiently).  
The thesis argues that collective deradicalization has a greater, more long-term 
impact and states’ efforts must work toward this. However, it is also recognized that 
individual deradicalization and individual and collective disengagement play a part. With 
this recognition, the thesis utilizes mechanisms from all four areas, individual and 
collective disengagement and individual and collective deradicalization, in order to 
evaluate a state’s deradicalization campaign. 
H. DESIGN FRAMEWORK 
The literature review exposes a continued debate on the individual versus 
collective causes of disengagement and deradicalization. In order to address this debate, 
the design framework is explicitly predicated upon four components. To better 
understand the framework set forth, an analogy of a cook and a chef is used. The cook 
reads a recipe, adds the ingredients, and prepares the food in a standard manner without 
deviating from the recipe. The chef understands the ingredients to develop a delicious 
dish. The cook is more focused on the science of cooking, whereas the chef is involved in 
the art of cooking. 
In this analogy, the ingredients are the mechanisms directed at both the individual 
and collective levels of disengagement and deradicalization. Most states function like the 
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cook when they need to operate like a chef. As chefs they can develop a creative and 
effective mix of mechanisms available to them to use against terrorist. 
Existing models (Ashour’s included) are insufficient prescriptive tools. These 
tools arm states as cooks because they merely change the quantity of ingredients without 
understanding the important characteristic of each ingredient. The essential characteristic 
of each ingredient is whether it seeks to deradicalize through individual or collective-
based means. The framework presented in this thesis can arm states as chefs by helping to 
educate them about the essential characteristics of various deradicalization programs. 
With a better understanding of the essential qualities, states can make 
contextualized decisions about which ingredients to add or take away. In developing this 
framework, four lines of effort (LOE) have been identified: individual disengagement, 
collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, and collective deradicalization. 
Within these LOEs there are several mechanisms that states use against terrorist 
organizations. Individual disengagement mechanisms work to change the violent 
behavior of individual terrorists, while collective disengagement mechanisms aim to stop 
the violent behavior of the group as a whole. Likewise, individual deradicalization 
mechanisms aim to change the radical beliefs of the individual, while collective 
deradicalization focuses on changing the beliefs of the group. Figure 1 illustrates a non-
exhaustive list of mechanisms a state can use within each LOE. We acknowledge that 
some the techniques have a dual role—these techniques broadly apply to 
counterterrorism, but the authors are primarily interested in those techniques that directly 




Figure 1.   Methodological Framework 
From this framework, the authors recognize three considerations. First, certain 
mechanisms may simultaneously relate to multiple LOEs. One example of such a 
mechanism is a state’s attempt to leverage existing social networks. Second, a state’s type 
of governance (democracy, authoritarian, theocracy, etc.) may affect which LOE a state 
uses and how the mechanisms within the LOE are utilized. Finally, state efforts towards 
individuals will rarely affect the group; however, state efforts against the collective will 
primarily have an effect on the collective, but may have a secondary effect on 
individuals. 
To evaluate a campaign’s effectiveness, Ashour’s (2009) types of 
deradicalization—comprehensive, substantive, and pragmatic—are utilized. According to 
Ashour, each of these types of deradicalization achieves distinction based upon the 
inclusion or exclusion of three fundamental levels of deradicalization—ideological, 







This case study will evaluate Algeria’s deradicalization efforts from 1995 to the 
present. Ashour, the most frequently cited expert on Algerian deradicalization, 
consistently uses Algeria as an example of successful deradicalization. According to 
Ashour (2009), the presence of charismatic leadership was the variable that caused the 
Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) to declare a cease-fire in 1997 and the absence of which 
caused the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to continue its violent rampage until 2005. This 
thesis seeks a more nuanced explanation pertaining to the nature of the state’s efforts. To 
set the stage for a closer look at Algeria’s deradicalization efforts it is beneficial to 
understand the key points of its recent history in combating militant Islam.   
In October 1988, mass protests of youth erupted against the ruling National 
Liberation Front (FLN) and provoked a gruesome response from the Algerian security 
forces. The protests were not instigated by any particular group; the common grievances 
were a list of unsatisfactory socio-economic conditions. The government declared a state 
of siege, security forces intervened, 500 civilians were killed, and another 3,500 were 
arrested. Mass marches resulted and President Chadli Benjedid responded by ushering in 
a new constitution, increased freedom of press, and facilitating some level of political 
inclusion (Cronin, 2009, p. 155). 
Bendjedid’s changes brought about the establishment of the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS), which beat the FLN in the 1991 elections. Their victory was rewarded with a 
bloodless coup by the National People’s Army (ANP). The ANP was the direct successor 
to the National Liberation Army (ALN), the armed wing of the defeated FLN party 
(Tlemçani, 2008, p. 12). For the next five to eight years the country spiraled deeper and 
deeper into civil war in which 150,000–200,000 Algerians were massacred or 
disappeared. The groups involved included the AIS, the armed wing of the FIS; the GIA, 
a splinter group with less political aspirations and a more violent approach; the Salafi 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a GIA splinter that did not want to target 
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civilians; and most recently Al-Qaida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or the 
remnants of GSPC under a new name. This is not an exhaustive list of all the groups 
involved, just the largest and those with the most responsibility for death and destruction.  
In 1999, President Bouteflika was elected President on a platform for 
reconciliation to end the terrible cycle of violence. The security environment in Algeria is 
far from perfect, but under Bouteflika the country benefited from a remarkable decrease 
in violence. While the storm of violence has calmed there are still questions as to whether 
or not the grievances that preceded the violence have been addressed.7 
With or without knowing, the majority of Algeria’s deradicalization efforts were 
focused at the group level. The research yielded very little evidence of individual 
deradicalization or disengagement mechanisms. That the programs worked supports the 
authors’ hypothesis and is in keeping with the body of literature on radicalization.   
B. LINES OF EFFORT 
1. Individual Disengagement 
Algerian security forces are somewhat notorious because of the harsh repression 
alleged to have taken place during the civil war of the 1990s. Of the “soft” approaches to 
deradicalization, individual disengagement was the least prevalent. 
a. Protection from Terrorist Group Reprisal 
The government did two things to assist members with personal or family 
security concerns. Families of GSPC members who refused to surrender were relocated 
to camps run by the ANP as a means to protect them from retaliation by competing 
groups (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, p. 110). With government assistance, a 
member might no longer need to stay in an armed group just to protect his family. Fear of 
                                                 
7 As of 2000, 12 million Algerians were living below the poverty line.  In 2006, Algeria’s Security 
Service reported that the wealth gap had increased and less than 20 percent of the population controlled 
more than 50 percent of the country’s wealth (Layachi, 2011, p. 490).  Algeria was also ranked only 100 of 




reprisals, from within the group or other militant groups, was another barrier to group 
exit. In recognition of this, the government provided weapons to key leaders within the 
AIS in order to buttress deradicalization legislation (Ashour, 2009, p. 126). As will be 
discussed below, many of the casualties that AIS sustained were from attacks by the GIA. 
The government-provided weapons were a demonstration of good intentions to encourage 
the AIS to surrender. 
b. Isolation in Prison Facilities 
Any prisoners thought to be indoctrinating other prisoners were isolated 
from general populations (Hearne & Laiq, 2010, p. 3). This is a simple technique, with 
varying degrees of effectiveness, which aims to counter the radicalization phenomenon 
that traditionally thrives in prisons. A charismatic individual who proselytizes to the 
general population can recruit additional members to garner resources for the group. By 
isolating these types of people the state prevents further recruitment. 
c. Provide Job Opportunities 
An aspect of President Bouteflika’s campaign was to facilitate 
employment opportunities in order to provide alternatives for former fighters. Initiatives 
included giving disengaged militants their previously held jobs, providing compensation, 
or a retirement pension for those of age (Hearne & Laiq, 2010, p. 3). Returning to work 
or being provided a means of sustenance was designed to stop feelings of being wronged 
by the state. Additionally, it is logical that if working and earning a sufficient income, 
people may be less likely to participate in violent activity as a means to provide resources 
for themselves or family members. 
To conclude, with evidence of only three mechanisms, this was the weakest of the 
four lines of effort in Algeria’s deradicalization campaign. Individual disengagement is 
the most basic tactic to reduce a terrorist organization and sometimes produces 
substantial results. However, governments often realize the futility of targeting 
individuals, so they cast larger nets to stop groups’ ability to conduct attacks. These 
efforts, categorized as collective disengagement, will be discussed in the next section.   
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2. Collective Disengagement 
The majority of Algeria’s disengagement efforts were leveled at groups, not 
individuals. The research identified seven mechanisms with state repression being the 
most elaborate, consisting of numerous techniques. In 1995, the government adopted a 
military repression strategy against Islamic militant groups because an Army General, 
Liamine Zeroual, won the Presidential election (Ashour, 2009, p. 118). Witnessing 
several failed negotiation attempts between the government and the FIS during the 1990s, 
Zeroual determined that a change in strategy was appropriate (Tlemçani, 2008; Roberts, 
2003). 
a. Environmental Manipulation 
A common goal for many of the Islamists groups was to overthrow the 
regime in favor of an Islamic state (Tawil, 2010, p. 68). However, the government 
intelligence service facilitated the disengagement of the AIS and others by keeping many 
groups with common goals polarized to each other via covert infiltration (International 
Crisis Group, 2004, p. 4).  “There is no doubt that the Algerian army’s intelligence 
services, which were able to infiltrate most if not all the various armed organizations, 
were instrumental in thwarting these attempts” (Roberts, 2008, p. 50). By infiltrating 
various groups the government made the groups fight each other more than jointly 
fighting against the state. The full extent to which government forces infiltrated these 
groups and the details of their actions are still not published in scholarly sources.   
The most recent technique of environmental manipulation employed by 
the state was the repeal of the “state of emergency” in 2011, which had been in place 
since the beginning of the civil war in 1992 (Arieff, 2011, p. 1). As a continuation of 
President Bouteflika’s reconciliation approach, the repeal should drastically reduce the 
amount of animosity toward the government by re-instating constitutional civil liberties. 
In addition to countering radicalization it appears that Algeria took steps 
to prevent it as well. The unemployment rate fell from 31 percent in 2003 to 11.8 percent 
in 2008 (Layachi, 2011, p. 490). According to the United Nations, Algeria’s Human 
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Development Index (HDI)8 is 0.698, which gives the country a rank of 96 out of 
187 countries. The HDI of Arab States as a region increased from 0.444 in 1980 to 
0.641 today, placing Algeria above the regional average (UN website, August 28, 2012). 
This research did not identify specific state efforts that led to these improvements. 
However, this is evidence that Algerian governance is improving and addressing some of 
the antecedent conditions to radicalization. 
b. State Repression 
Estimates vary, but all would agree that between 150,000 and 
200,000 Algerians were killed during the 1990s. The vicious cycle of violence was 
perpetuated by multiple organizations, including the GIA, AIS, GSPC, as well as 
government forces like the ANP, the paramilitary or gendarmes, and the Department of 
Intelligence Service (DRS) (Layachi, 2011). While state repression was prevalent, it is 
often overvalued when explaining the causes of terrorist group deradicalization in 
Algeria. Nonetheless, in addition to widespread attacks from the GIA, the AIS was also 
under heavy pressure from the ANP and other state security forces. Medani Mezraq, the 
former emir of AIS stated, “We declared ceasefire because the jihad was about to be 
buried by the hands of its own sons” (Ashour, 2009, p. 110).  
Algerian Army forces are currently positioned in southern Algeria to block 
AQIM and other militants from creeping north into the more populated areas of Algeria 
(Interview, 2012). For the sake of brevity, a detailed list of all security force operations, 
which might be considered leadership targeting, is not provided. These operations are 
categorized as collective disengagement because the intent was not to stop the violent 
actions of one man, it was to disrupt the group and thereby stop the actions of many. In 
fact, often times the targeted leaders were not suspected of violent crimes themselves, but 
wanted for ordering others to conduct these activities. 
                                                 
8 The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the average achievements in a country in three 
basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent 
standard of living. Data availability determines HDI country coverage. To enable cross-country 
comparisons, the HDI is, to the extent possible, calculated based on data from leading international data 
agencies and other credible data sources. 
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State repression unquestionably had an effect on the AIS cessation, but it 
would be more accurate to say that violence in general was a primary causal factor. 
Medani Mezraq wanted Algerian people to know that AIS was not responsible for all of 
the massacres (Hafez, 2000, p. 590). So, it was not just the pressure from AIS/FIS 
members dying, it was that Mezraq did not believe in the same degree of violence as the 
GIA and he did not want to be associated with it either. Outside of state repression, there 
exists evidence of several other group disengagement mechanisms.  
c. Targeting Key Leaders 
A few examples are provided to demonstrate the state’s willingness to 
conduct decapitation operations in order to compel or maintain disengagement. Ali 
Benhadj, a key leader in the FIS was arrested and interrogated by police in September 
2003, after he announced a press conference to discuss a potential FIS comeback (Ait-
Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, p. 124). On 20 June 2004, four GSPC leaders were killed 
by the army near Bejaia in Kabylia (ICG, 2004, p. 22). More recently, Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar, a founding member of AQIM was killed in fighting in Northern Mali 
(Suicide Bomber Kills one in Algeria Attack, 2012). The effectiveness of leadership 
targeting is widely debated in security studies.9  In some cases, an organization can be 
made more vulnerable to other state efforts when their leaders are removed. In other 
cases the organization is strengthened with new motivation or because they re-structure. 
In Algeria, the kinetic leadership targeting of GSPC and AQIM has helped reduce 
violence activity because it has kept the group in a constant cycle of re-organization.          
d. Negotiations 
Contact operations were low visibility attempts to negotiate with armed 
groups. The most noteworthy example was Army General Lamari’s meetings with 
Medani Mezraq in 1997, which will be discussed later. The government also made 
negotiation attempts in conjunction with a fierce offensive in Babor Mountains, which 
                                                 
 9 For a concise summary of theories and a recent argument see Johnston, Patrick B. (2012) “Does 
Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency 
Campaigns” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79. 
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resulted in approximately 300 GSPC members surrendering (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 
2007, p. 109). This is categorized as collective disengagement because the contacts were 
made with organizational leaders and resulted in groups of people disengaging.     
e. Social Networks 
According to the U.S. Department of State (2011), the Algerian Ministry 
of Religious Affairs uses Radio Qu’ran to speak directly to masses of radicalized fighters 
in the mountains. Former terrorists are used to address active fighters to convince them to 
lay down their weapons and stop fighting (p. 95). This mechanism falls under 
disengagement because the former fighters do not address the belief in using violence, 
just the act itself. It is worth noting here that it is entirely possible for deradicalization to 
take place prior to disengagement. For a number of reasons, a fighter’s belief in violent 
means can wither but he may stay engaged. 
The previous two sections explored the mechanisms that the Algerian state used 
in the last 20 years to disengage militants from radicalized organizations. None of these 
mechanisms aimed directly at changing an individual’s or a group’s belief system. 
Research shows that the majority of Algeria’s disengagement mechanisms were at the 
group level. In the next section, the analysis focuses on mechanisms that affect a change 
in radical belief systems.  
3.  Individual Deradicalization 
Effective deradicalization mechanisms can lead to disengagement first in some 
cases, but the process is not always linear (Horgan, 2009). Internationally, the most 
common form of individual deradicalization is prison based re-education programs. 
Algeria does not have a prison-based program. In fact, similar to their disengagement 
efforts, most of Algeria’s deradicalization efforts are aimed at the group, not the 
individual. However, evidence exists of two specific programs that fall into individual 
deradicalization.   
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a.  Removal of Community Leaders 
Since gaining independence from France in 1962, Algeria has recognized 
Islam as the official religion, but maintained a secular democracy. The Ministry of 
Religious Affairs oversees religious matters, which works as a deradicalization 
mechanism that seeks to identify and address radicalization problems early. According to 
Algerian law, imams suspected of delivering inappropriate sermons “can be summoned to 
a ‘scientific council’ composed of Islamic law scholars” (DOS, 2011, p. 5; Kasim, 2007, 
p. 3). The imam is not necessarily engaged in violent acts but his sermon may have 
indicated a belief in the use of violence. By re-educating these imams through counseling 
the state attempts to adjust their belief system and prevent the spread of radical rhetoric. 
The penal code states that only government-authorized imams can lead prayer in mosques 
and establishes strict punishments, including fines of up to 200,000 dinars ($2,782) and 
prison sentences of one to three years, for anyone other than a government-designated 
imam who preaches in a mosque (DOS, 2011, p. 6). However, not all radical beliefs 
stems from religious teachings.  
b. Delegitimizing Violence  
With so much death and destruction during the civil war some of the 
radical beliefs were simply revenge based. To counter this, the Ministry of National 
Solidarity spent approximately $50 million from 2005 to 2007 in death gratuity payments 
to the families of victims allegedly “disappeared” or killed by government forces 
(Tlemçani, 2008, p. 8). These payments were an effort to reconcile with the people most 
likely to embrace violence as a result of the anger generated by their unjust losses. This 
program was not oriented on any specific group. Any individuals who felt their loved 
ones were wrongly killed/disappeared by the state could apply for compensation. 
Arguably, these payments diminished many families’ justification for the use of violence. 
President Bouteflika did not focus on dismantling terrorist groups by just 
changing individual’s beliefs. The low quantity of individual deradicalization programs 
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suggests that they were only a supporting effort in the deradicalization campaign. The 
final section of this case study details the regime’s collective deradicalization efforts.   
4.  Collective Deradicalization 
It is well established that the deradicalization process is not always a linear 
sequence. Nevertheless, group deradicalization is the ultimate goal. Of the four lines of 
effort analyzed, this LOE is composed of mechanisms that aimed most directly at the 
problem. During the period studied, Algeria’s efforts were most heavily weighted in this 
line of effort. Some used multiple techniques, but all with the same goal in mind—stop 
radical Islamist groups from embracing violence as their voice to call for change. 
a. Negotiations 
On several occasions throughout the 1990s the government tried, 
unsuccessfully, to negotiate peace agreements with the FIS (Roberts, 2003). After formal 
talks failed, less formal dialogues prevailed. In 1997, direct negotiations between the AIS 
(Mezraq) and the ANP (Gen Lamari) became the basis for the AIS cease-fire and 
subsequent deradicalization (Ashour, 2009, p. 113). According to an International Crisis 
Group (2001) report: 
The agreement set out a list of terms: ‘general amnesty for all groups 
joining the truce; concentration of all AIS factions and other armed groups 
in precise locations under the control of the ANP; integration of ex-
servicemen in special ANP units; drafting of a law to provide a legal 
framework for the truce; release of ex-FIS leaders within 18 months; State 
compensation for all victims, etc…’, but above all they culminated in a 
promise to the effect that the ex-FIS would be allowed to return to the 
political arena (under another name, with a new direction totally 
unconnected with ‘the past’ and ‘in accordance with the provisions of the 
1996 constitution’). (p. 4) 
The scope and depth of these negotiations are the reason they are 
categorized here as deradicalization instead of disengagement. These were not simple 
negotiations to arrange a temporary cease-fire; they were agreements which have 
compared to international peace talks, aimed at solving more meaningful problems.   
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On a smaller scale, an uprising and conflict in the Kabylia region in 2001 
prompted the government to initiate a dialogue with local leaders and to grant a major 
Berber demand: recognition of their language, Tamazight, as a national language (Gera, 
2007, p. 86; Arieff, 2011, p. 12). The action was intended to moderate the Berbers and 
demonstrate that violence was not required. The original demand was for the language to 
have a more formal status and to have all Gendarmerie removed from Kabylia. This is 
significant because the Berber areas are in the mountains where there are minimal 
security forces and, unsurprisingly, a focus area for AQIM. 
b. Social Interaction with Moderates 
Although not well documented, the Algerian government facilitated 
interaction between its organic violent Islamist groups and more moderate Muslim 
scholars from Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Ashour, 2009, p. 133). Highly respected scholars 
from these bedrock locations helped to moderate the AIS leading up to their 
deradicalization. More recent interaction with scholars from the same locations has 
helped to keep splinter organizations disengaged from activity although they maintain 
their weapons and skepticism about completely deradicalizing (Ashour, 2009, p. 134). 
c. Amnesty 
The aforementioned negotiations were all informal until legalized in the 
1999 Law on Civil Concord (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, p. 108). The main points 
of the law were a pardon for all insurgents not guilty of murder or rape and the 
legalization of the 1997 negotiations (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 3; Gera, 2007, 
p. 85; Tlemçani, 2008, p. 6). The goal of this legislation was to convince the active 
members of the group that the new government, under recently elected Bouteflika, was 
serious about reconciling with the AIS. Passing this law was an important signal from the 
government that it was committed to honoring the AIS-ANP agreements. The problem 
with the law is that instead of reduced sentences for certain crimes and deliberate 
investigations, it resulted in a blanket pardon for nearly anyone who surrendered 
(Tlemçani, 2008, p. 7). At this point, the GIA and GSPC, were not considered for 
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amnesty for several reasons including suspected ties to al-Qa’ida (ICG, 2004, p. 15). This 
represents another example of a mechanism originally categorized as disengagement that 
falls under deradicalization because of the Algerian context. This law was nested in 
President Bouteflika’s campaign to reverse the violent trend in Algeria by stopping the 
belief in violent solutions. 
In 2005, President Bouteflika ushered in his second large-scale agreement, 
the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (Gera, 2007, p. 93). The main points 
included amnesty for militants, clemency for security services involved in insurgent 
repression, and compensation for victim’s families. This legislation is considered 
deradicalization because it sought to build upon the somewhat successful disengagement 
that had already taken place. Violence was already on the decline and the president was 
trying to help the country get past the national tragedy without extending the quarrels. 
d. Prisoner Release 
Between 1999 and 2005, tens of thousands of political prisoners were 
released (Ashour, 2009, p. 126). As discussed under state repression, terrorists in prison 
were disengaged from violent activity. However, releasing prisoners also had a 
disengagement effect because many on the outside were fighting simply to free their 
wrongly detained leaders. After being released and supported by the government, groups 
such as the AIS were compelled to deradicalize because they could see that dialogue 
produced better results than continued violence. 
e. Government Clean-Up 
A major grievance that has driven Algerian youth toward the Islamist 
cause is rampant government corruption (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007). Under 
Bouteflika, the government removed 1,050 previously elected officials from office and 
arrested another 500. Additionally, the courts charged 349 mayors (25% of the total) with 
insider trading. Of those mayors, 12 were judged and given jail terms (Ait-Hamadouche 
& Zoubir, 2007, p. 108). In 2004, General Mohamed Lamari, a longtime proponent of the 
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eradication strategy,10 retired and was replaced with a general more synchronized with 
the Bouteflika administration (Layachi, 2011, p. 493). Efforts to remove corrupt officials 
and improve democratic processes are collective deradicalization because these measures 
address grievances and entice radicals to reject violence in lieu of political participation.  
f. Apology 
Apology is probably the most basic means to moderate anger from any 
grievance because it tends to acknowledge responsibility for wrongdoing. President 
Bouteflika apologized to a large group of former AIS in a speech (Ashour, 2009, p. 126). 
He did this because many of the fighters who had surrendered were still being harassed 
because of past transgressions. The apology was backed by further government efforts to 
ensure the social reintegration of those who surrendered. This was a deradicalization 
mechanism because the system responded, in deeds and words, to the complaints of 
disengaged Islamists, which demonstrated that violence was not necessary. 
g. Re-education 
The state used Radio Qu’ran in two different ways. To complement the 
disengagement requests by former fighters, the state enlists religious scholars to refute 
AQIM justification for violence. This is a mechanism more akin to the re-education 
efforts that have become popular in countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the last 
10 years. Islamic re-education is deradicalization in its purest form. In this situation the 
religious sermons were collective deradicalization because the radio broadcasts were 
directed at groups of fighters hiding out not individuals in prison-based programs.    
The Ministry of Religious Affairs has established policies for hiring 
teachers at Quranic schools (DOS, 2011, p. 95). The effect of this mechanism is 
comparable to the control of sermons for Friday prayers. The state wants to moderate 
radical underpinnings and promote moderation in order to evaporate the pool of recruits 
for violent groups.   
                                                 
10 In “De-radicalization in Algeria” Ashour (2009) explains that the body of different authorities in the 
1990s is often divided into two categories: eradicators and dialogists (p. 112). 
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h. Religious Moderation 
The final mechanism that Algeria employs is its embrace of Sufi Islam. 
According to experts from Algeria, the state “began a policy of endorsing and supporting 
Sufism as a more moderate alternative to more radical Salafis and more conservative 
Wahhabis” (Khemissi, Larémont, & Eddine, 2012, p. 550). The states support for Sufism 
simultaneously provides for the Islamic identity of Algeria while removing violence as an 
acceptable means for seeking change.   
The number of different mechanisms shows that Algeria’s deradicalization efforts 
were primarily oriented at the group level. Aside from the quantity, the overall majority 
of effort within Algeria’s deradicalization campaign resided in these mechanisms in 
accordance with President Bouteflika’s policy beginning in 1999. State and GIA 
sponsored repression definitely played a role in AIS deradicalization, but the body of 
literature on radicalization suggests that these programs oriented on groups of people and 
collective identity were more important. 
Figure 2 illustrates the degree to which each LOE contributed to Algeria’s 
success. A campaign taking this shape can encourage reduced violence overall, but the 
radical ideology may continue longer with smaller terrorist groups. The collective 
deradicalization and disengagement efforts were the most effective LOEs. Within these 
two LOEs, environmental manipulation, negotiations, and amnesty were the most 
important mechanisms. It was these mechanisms that comprised the majority of the laws 
passed in 1999 and 2005 under President Bouteflika. Although some organizations 
criticize the regime for failing to seek adequate justice for those wronged during the 
1990s, the regime has consciously chosen to implement policies that help the country 




Figure 2.   Algeria’s Effectiveness 
The individual disengagement LOE was the third biggest contributor to Algeria’s 
effectiveness. Within this LOE the protection from reprisals was most important to 
facilitating exit from terrorist groups.    
Individual deradicalization efforts made the least contribution to Algeria’s 
success. The delegitimizing of violence mechanism was relatively small in scale when 
assessed in terms of dollars allocated for the program and the re-education mechanism 
used is typically by states as part of prevention programs. 
C. OUTCOME 
Was the Algerian campaign effective at deradicalizing Islamist insurgent groups?  
The answer is yes, for some, and no, for others. The AIS went through comprehensive 
deradicalization, which includes the ideological, behavioral, and organizational levels of 
deradicalization. AIS initially disengaged when Mezraq declared a cease-fire in 1997 
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(Ashour, 2008). At that time, “an estimated 3000 militants obeyed the order, including 
many from the GIA…” (Tlemçani, 2008, p. 5). The AIS never returned to using violence 
and Mezraq continues to voice his ambition to join the political process, pursue his goals 
peacefully, and has appealed to GSPC/AQIM to cease their violent activity (Saidani, 
2007a, 2007b).  
The GIA was not offered a truce in 1999 and refused amnesty in 2005, but 
eventually dissipated. Their demise was caused by a combination of substantive 
deradicalization, which facilitated security forces killing or capturing the remnants of the 
hardcore leadership. Although the Bouteflika peace agreements were not aimed at the 
GIA as a group, they still had a positive effect. First, as previously noted, some factions 
in the GIA followed Medani Mezraq and laid down their weapons in 1997. Hassan 
Hattab splintered off with a sizeable group because of opposition to the killing of 
innocent civilians and renamed itself the GSPC. Both events are prime examples 
Ashour’s (2009) substantive deradicalization.     
D. CONCLUSION 
By 2006, armed rebellion had been reduced to remnants of the GSPC (Mortimer, 
2007, p. 36). In the same year, GSPC officially franchised with AQ and changed its 
names to AQIM. This drove another wedge into the group because “much of the 
organization rejected the merger with al-Qaida, often bitterly. In some instances, GSPC 
members renounced violence…” (Byman, 2012, p. 39). The name change also helped the 
Algerian government. First, with an international label the Islamists’ group could no 
longer cling to the narrative of a repressed opposition to the incumbent government. 
Second, Algeria received more international support for their security services because 
their fight was now part of the global struggle against AQ (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 
2007, pp. 114–115).   
By 2007, Hassan Hattab, the former GSPC leader, surrendered to an amnesty 
offer from the government, his replacement was subsequently killed by government 
forces and they lost popular support due to the reconciliation efforts of the state. The 
28 
 
name change from GSPC to AQIM is perceived as a plea for AQ help because GSPC was 
losing the battle in Algeria (Anonymous, 2006). At this point, AQIM is no longer 
conducting a high number of attacks against global targets. They talk a lot about hating 
America, China, and France, but have not done much about it (Filiu, 2009, p. 9). The 
empty rhetoric is great for Algeria because AQIM is losing its base of support. Algeria’s 
Islamic rebellions have typically been nationalistic, which is why AQIM may be having 
trouble garnering support in Algeria with its supposed global aspirations. 
Emergence of peaceful opposition groups like the Front for Socialist Forces and 
National Coordination for Change and Democracy demonstrates that there is less radical 
thinking in the country, which suggests that deradicalization and anti-radicalization 
efforts have been successful (Arieff, 2011, p. 2). Research experts and international 
security agencies agree that the Islamist problem in Algeria has significantly improved. 
Tlemçani (2008) states, “Algeria has regained stability, with radical Islamism no longer a 
fundamental threat to security across the country” (p. 1). In comparison to the rest of the 
Maghreb region Algeria has experienced the most significant drop in Islamist activity 
since 1997 (Rogan, 2008). 
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III. SAUDI ARABIA 
A.  BACKGROUND 
In 2003, Saudi Arabian internal security threats from Muslim radicals led to the 
development of a strategy to attack extremist ideology. However, this problem in Saudi 
Arabia predated the year 2003. In 2001, 15 of the 19 hijackers that attacked the United 
States were from Saudi Arabia (Gendron, 2010, p. 488). This alarming fact initially 
elicited a rather lethargic response from the Saudi Arabian government. In 2002, 
extremist attacks within Saudi borders continued. The majority of incidents resulted in 
the death of foreign nationals (Peterson, 2007; Ezzarqui, 2010).  
A car bombing in Riyadh that involved three vehicles in 2003 changed the 
Saudis’ approach. Although the attack primarily targeted Westerners, its severity—
34 dead (Peterson, 2007; Riedel & Saab, 2008; Ezzarqui, 2010)—jolted the government 
into action announcing a new counterterrorism strategy. Later that same year, 17 Saudis 
were killed and hundreds injured in a truck bomb attack; this attack prompted the 
strongest call to action from Saudi citizens. In 2004, following an intense direct action 
campaign designed to capture or kill extremists, the Ministry of Interior initiated a 
counseling program to re-educate captured Islamists (Zoepf, 2008). At this point in time 
the Saudi government began to fight “a war of ideas” (Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 
2011, p. 6) through initiatives aimed at changing the radical and deviant thoughts of those 
committing acts of violence. 
The Saudi Arabian deradicalization campaign is lauded as one of the most 
effective in the world, specifically the Munasaha, or Advisory Committee, which started 
in 2004 after the terrorist attacks of 2003 (Cline, 2009). The purpose of the overall 
campaign is to help people with takfiri beliefs “repent and abandon terrorist ideologies” 
(Boucek, 2009, p. 213). It is important to note that most soft approaches are typically 
designed for terrorist supporters, not individuals physically involved in violent terrorist 
attacks. This is often cited as a criticism of the overall effort, but the criticism does not 
negate the importance of deradicalizing supporters of radical Islam. In the end, without a 
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dedicated support network, the hardcore terrorist would be much more challenged to 
execute an attack. This has in fact been the case within Saudi Arabia as they battled al-
Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
To understand why Saudi Arabia would use these soft approaches, one must first 
understand that Saudi Arabia has a history of government programs intended to 
rehabilitate criminal prisoners (Boucek, 2009, p. 213). These programs help families cope 
with having a spouse or parent who is imprisoned or has recently been released from 
prison and include activities such as assistance with marriage, small business loans, job 
placement, direct support in the form of groceries and holiday gifts, and rewards to 
recognize high achievers. The use of religious leaders is also well documented within 
Saudi efforts to rehabilitate prisoners (Boucek, 2009, p. 214). 
B.  LINES OF EFFORT 
1.  Individual Disengagement 
Within individual disengagement, eight mechanisms have been identified: capture 
or kill, promote marriage, provide job opportunities, provide job training, social 
networks, detainee release, publication of militants names, and removal of community 
leaders. All of these mechanisms aim to stop the behavior of individuals in their efforts 
against the state. 
a.  Capture or Kill 
Following the 13 May bombing, Saudi Arabia undertook significant 
repressive measures against AQAP. A large component of these measures was to arrest or 
kill AQAP militants. Raids by Saudi security forces and shootouts between the security 
forces and AQAP were common and typically resulted in the killing or capturing of 
individuals (Oxford Analytica, 2003a, 2004a; Hegghammer, 2010a). The Saudi 
authorities took actual and suspected operatives off the streets on a regular, almost 
weekly basis (Oxford Analytica, 2004b). The Ministry of Interior has also announced the 
arrest or death of militants within the kingdom. This has occurred as late as August 2009 
where the capture of forty-four militants was announced (Hegghammer, 2010a, pp. 3010–
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3011; Oxford Analytica, 2011). Finally, Saudi authorities made it a point to publish the 
names if the most wanted militants operating within the kingdom. Following the 
publication of the names, security forces went to great lengths to target those individuals 
and either arrest or kill in security operations—the security forces became very efficient 
(Reidel & Saab, 2008; Oxford Analytica, 2005b, 2006a; Hegghammer, 2006b). 
By capturing or killing the militants who opposed the state, Saudi Arabia 
was able to physically remove these individuals and prevent them from conducting 
further attacks against the state. Those incarcerated remain in prison unable to conduct 
attacks. Additionally, by taking these individuals off the streets, Saudi Arabia removed 
experienced terrorists from the organization. Over time, this degraded the experience 
within AQAP and reduced its efficiency and lethality. 
b. Promote Marriage 
The promotion of marriage typically takes place when a captured 
individual is undergoing the re-education process in Saudi Arabia’s Care and Counseling 
Program run by the Advisory Committee. This program works “to reintegrate 
deviants/extremists back into society, change their behavior (disengage them) and change 
their beliefs (deradicalize them)” (Royal Embassy, 2011, p. 7). As part of the release and 
after-care component of the program, the counselors promote and encourage marriage for 
those who are single. The Counseling Program may provide assistance in finding a bride 
or providing money to help meet the male’s requirement for marriage such as having an 
apartment (al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007, 2008a, 2009; El-Said, 2012, Seifert, 2010). 
Saudi’s promotion of marriage is not just aimed at single males. The 
Counseling Program takes steps to reinforce the bonds between those who are already 
married. The program allows and encourages family visits to include private visits with 
the spouse (Ansary, 2008; Boucek, 2008b). Additionally, the program provides a 
significant amount of counseling support to the family, specifically the spouse if the 
detainee is married, in order to facilitate the reintegration process of both the detainee and 
the spouse (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007; El-Said, 2012).  
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Overall, the intent behind promoting marriage is to provide the individual 
with additional responsibilities and countervailing pressures that prevent him from 
engaging in violence against the state. By facilitating a marriage or rebuilding a marriage, 
Saudi Arabia is able to reestablish the cultural norm of a man’s responsibility to provide 
for his family. Fulfilling this responsibility provides the individual with something to do 
other than violence. 
c. Provide Job Opportunities 
As part of the after-care component of the Counseling Program, the 
Advisory Committee works to assist in finding jobs for soon-to-be-released individuals 
(Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007, 2009; El-Said, 2012; Zoepf, 2008). This is part of the 
support the government provides to individuals through the program. The intent is to 
physically give the individual something to do. Second, it provides him with an income 
after becoming economically marginalized for not being employed while in detention. 
The income allows him to support his family, which may have been facilitated by the 
state as discussed under marriage. 
d. Provide Job Training 
As with job opportunities discussed above, the Advisory Committee also 
provides opportunities for detained individuals to receive or take part in job skills 
training. This may also include finishing basic education (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 
2007, 2009; El-Said, 2012; Zoepf, 2008). Here the intent is to provide the detained 
individual with necessary skills to obtain a job once released from detention whether 
government provides the job or the individual finds his own job. This mechanism 
appropriately supports the previous mechanism. 
e. Social Networks 
This mechanism aims to place the individual in a positive social network. 




opportunities. These two mechanisms provide new, non-radical networks for the 
individual to associate himself with in order to prevent him from turning back to his 
errant ways. 
The second aspect of this mechanism is through the separation of the 
individual from the radical prison population. Detainees slated for the Counseling 
Program are placed in separate prisons. These prisons are designed specifically for these 
detainees and do not contain general or radical prison populations (Boucek, 2008b). 
Following a detainee’s release from incarceration after completing the 
Counseling Program, detainees are allowed and encouraged to maintain contact with the 
clerics and counselors they worked with during their time in the program. This allows the 
detainees to maintain the positive networks they built. Additionally, this allows the 
government to continue to monitor released detainees following their release (Ezzarqui, 
2010).  
f. Detainee Release 
There have been between 700 and 1,500 individuals released from 
incarceration after completing the Counseling Program as well as several former 
Guantanamo detainees (Ansary, 2008; Oxford Analytica, 2008a; Peterson, 2007; Reidel 
& Saab, 2008). Release from the Counseling program, which Guantánamo detainees of 
Saudi origin go through, is conditional upon successful completion of the program and 
completion of any prison sentence that may remain. Upon release, an individual may find 
himself with a job, an apartment, a stipend, and even a car (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 
2007, 2008a, 2009; El-Said, 2012). The release, along with these incentives, constitutes a 
contract with the state. The individual agrees to disengage from violence. If the 
individual violates the contract and returns to violence the state will arrest or kill him. 
The detainee’s release also demonstrates a level of benevolence by the state. 
g. Publication of Militants’ Names 
On several occasions since May 2003, Saudi Arabia has published the 
names and pictures of its most wanted militants thought to be operating within the 
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kingdom at that time (Peterson, 2007; Obaid & Cordesman, 2005; Hegghammer, 2010). 
Though this tactic is not new among nation-states, it did facilitate disengagement to some 
degree. The publication made it more difficult for militants to operate within the kingdom 
now that the general public knew whom they were and what they were trying to do. 
Additionally, it focused Saudi security forces specifically on those individuals, generating 
raids that resulted from citizen tips (Hegghammer, 2010b).  
h. Disengagement of Community Leaders 
As part of the strategy to stop the spread of radical ideology, Saudi Arabia 
has fired thousands of lower level clerics who were deemed to be preaching a version of 
Islam inconsistent with the state approved version. There has also been the removal of 
teachers who have incited violence (Ansary, 2008; Oxford Analytica, 2003a, 2003b; 
Peterson, 2007). To complement the firing, Saudi electronically monitors those who 
retained their position (Ansary, 2008). This acts as a deterrent to prevent clerics from 
promoting jihad and inciting violence, especially among youth. 
2.  Collective Disengagement 
This research identified five mechanisms under collective disengagement used by 
Saudi Arabia: state repression, amnesty, target key leaders, environmental manipulation, 
and surrenders and recants. The last mechanism, surrenders and recants, is specific to 
Saudi Arabia. As stated earlier, the list of mechanisms is not all-inclusive. These 
mechanisms aim to prevent the group from using violence. 
a.  State Repression 
Following the May 2003 bombing there was a significant crackdown by 
Saudi security forces on extremists operating within the kingdom resulting in numerous 
shootouts. This appears to have occurred heavily throughout the summer of 2003 before 
easing. Despite the “massive crackdown” on militants, all accounts point to Saudi’s 
restricted or restrained use of force against the militants primarily conducted by internal 
security forces such as the police. Saudi police targeted key leaders, raided known safe 
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houses, and primarily arrested known militants in an effort to prevent Saudi citizens from 
becoming caught up in the violence. The police also made it a point to not torture 
militants who were captured. The Saudi government aired interviews of captured 
militants who positively described their conditions while incarcerated (Oxford Analytica, 
2004b, 2004d; Hegghammer, 2006a, 2006b, 2010a). 
This police crackdown clearly demonstrates the repressive measures used 
by the state. However, these measures focused specifically on the group. By targeting the 
leadership, removing safe houses, and arresting fighters Saudi Arabia was able to apply 
pressure directly on the group without adversely affecting the citizens. The focused 
pressure applied to the group put all members of the group on the run from the security 
apparatus. The pressure removed leaders and experienced members early in the fight 
against AQAP, ultimately making it much more difficult for AQAP to operate 
(Hegghammer, 2010a).  
b. Amnesty 
King Abdullah provided two general amnesty periods to all militants 
operating within the kingdom. The first, one month long amnesty was provided on 
23 June 2004 and a second, one month long amnesty was provided on 26 June 2006 
(Bashir, 2004; Hegghammer, 2010a, 2010b; Peterson, 2007). The conditions of amnesty 
were simple—turn yourself in and all will be forgiven. There was a third amnesty-type 
announcement in December 2007. During this announcement, Saudi youth were 
prohibited from conducting jihad abroad and encouraged to turn themselves in if they 
were planning on conducting jihad. Those who turned themselves in voluntarily would 
have their surrender taken into account (Glass & Yehoshua, 2008).  
There were six individuals who surrendered after the first amnesty period. 
These surrenders were highly publicized providing the illusion of desertion among 
AQAP members (Hegghammer, 2010b). Additionally, the six were later released after a 
short period of incarceration (Peterson, 2007). Their release adds to the detainee release 
mechanism described earlier in that it demonstrates benevolence on the part of the state 
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and demonstrates that the state will remain true to its word. The short time in detention 
for the six also infers that they were questioned about their knowledge of AQAP 
leadership, safe house, and future operations. All of which, presumably, facilitated 
security operations to some degree. 
The actual surrender of operatives and supporters, the appearance of a 
high level of desertion among AQAP members aided by Saudi media efforts, and the 
focused and repressive effort by security forces arguably forced AQAP to take an 
introspective look at its members and whom it was recruiting into its ranks. This 
introspection facilitated the disengagement of the group by changing the priority from 
planning operations to watching each other. 
c. Target Key Leaders 
As discussed earlier, Saudi Arabia took significant steps to specifically 
target the leaders of AQAP. This was part of the broader effort to limit the negative 
effects on Saudi citizens as a result of the Saudi response on terrorism. Within the first 
few months of operations against AQAP, Saudi security forces killed the leader, Yusuf 
al-Ayiri, and other senior commanders within the organization (Oxford Analytica, 2006a; 
Hegghammer, 2006b). The killing of key operational leaders within the organization 
continued for the next few years. Approximately one year later, another charismatic 
leader, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, was killed when Saudi forces raided the group’s 
headquarters (Hegghammer, 2006b). Subsequent leaders were less qualified and faced the 
same fate as the two most important leaders in AQAP’s organization. In 2005, Saudi 
security forces raided a farmhouse resulting in the death of at least 14 senior leaders 
(Hegghammer, 2010b).  
Saudi security forces did not stop with just killing operational leaders. 
Saudi Arabia also targeted the clerics and ideologues that directly supported AQAP. 
Early in the Saudi efforts against AQAP, three prominent clerics who directly supported 
the group and provided the religious backing to their violent actions were arrested. This 
eliminated the only credible religious authority the group had at that time (Hegghammer, 
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2010a, 2010b; Peterson, 2007).   To make matters worse, the Saudi government 
convinced these three clerics to publicly repent and admit the error of their way 
(Hegghammer, 2010a). 
In highlighting the effect of targeting the leaders, Hegghammer (2010b) 
identified that “the group was so dependent on al-Muqrin’s leadership…that [his] 
removal made the organization start imploding” (p. 17). This is the desired effect of 
targeting key leaders. Saudi Arabia effectively did this as it removed every leader of the 
organization and a majority of the senior leaders, ultimately disrupting the organization’s 
ability to plan and conduct operations. 
d. Environmental Manipulation 
Hegghammer (2006b, 2010a) suggests that economic conditions and 
unemployment play a role in the recruitment and radicalization of terrorists. While this is 
not the sole contributing factor to violence, Saudi Arabia recognizes the effect. 
Subsequently, Saudi Arabia has made efforts to initiate economic reforms and reduce 
unemployment amongst Saudi nationals. Saudi has done this primarily through education 
and labor reforms. Within education, Saudi Arabia has provided more money to better 
train Saudis in the technical skills they lack to work in the various industries within the 
country (Oxford Analytica, 2008a, 2008b). From the labor perspective, Saudi Arabia has 
worked to increase the number of jobs available to Saudi nationals through a variety of 
regulations on the private sector (Oxford Analytica, 2004b, 2008a). Specifically, the 
Saudi government has done this by creating regulations that discourage businesses from 
hiring foreigners (Oxford Analytica, 2004b). 
By increasing the technical abilities of young males and increasing the 
number of jobs available to young men, Saudi Arabia is able to limit AQAP’s ability to 
recruit these individuals. Saudi Arabia has enabled a reduction in the recruiting the pool 
of young men at a time when Saudi security forces are either eliminating or arresting the 
more experienced members of AQAP. This adversely affects the collective ability of the 
organization to take violent action against the state. 
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e. Surrender and Recant 
Saudi Arabia has been able to affect the surrender of many militants, not 
just those mentioned earlier under amnesty. These have included AQAP supporters, a 
local AQAP leader, a high-ranking AQAP operative, a wife of a senior militant, and 
general-purpose fighters. In addition to surrenders, Saudi Arabia has been able to affect 
the recanting or repenting of former militants and formerly pro-AQAP clerics 
(Hegghammer, 2010a; Peterson, 2007). The primary component of this mechanism is the 
publicity of the surrenders and the recanting (Hegghammer, 2010b). Saudi Arabia has 
used television extensively in showing militants turn themselves in, denounce violence, 
and even confess. The best example of this is the show Jihad Experiences, the Deceit. 
This was a five part series that showed confessions of captured terrorists, as well as Saudi 
scholars and clerics, retracting previous statements supporting violence (Ansary, 2008; 
Usher, 2005). The public display of surrenders and recants serves to promote more 
members of the organization disengaging from violence against the state. 
3.  Individual Deradicalization 
Individual deradicalization aims to change an individual’s belief in the use of 
violence. In Saudi Arabia, the focus is on teaching the “‘right jihad’ vs the ‘wrong jihad’” 
(Cline, 2009, p. 5). The research indicates that Saudi Arabia uses three mechanisms under 
individual deradicalization. They are family building, community responsibility, and re-
education. 
a. Family Building 
Saudi culture has strong cultural norms surrounding familial and tribal 
relations and the notion of honor. The Counseling Program uses these cultural norms to 
rebuild the relationship between the detainee and his family (Boucek, 2007, 2008a, 2009; 
Ezzarqui, 2010). The family, through frequent visits, is used as an anchor point to 
facilitate pulling the detainee away from his previous beliefs and behavior. 
Additionally, the family receives counseling offered by the Advisory 
Committee. While an individual is still detained, the counseling assists the family in 
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coping with a detainee’s absence and the shame it can bring upon the family and the tribe 
(Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007; El-Said, 2012). A detainee’s family can also receive 
counseling on reintegration, which improves the process of reintegrating the rehabilitated 
individual back into the family in order to strengthen the bonds between the family and 
the individual. The intent is to make the value of the family greater than the belief in 
violence. 
b. Community Responsibility 
As with family building, the strong Saudi cultural norms surrounding 
familial and tribal relations and the notions of honor play a significant part in community 
responsibility. Saudi Arabia uses these norms to place responsibility for the individual on 
the family network (Boucek, 2008a, 2009). This is done in two ways. If the detainee is 
still participating in the Counseling Program and is released to attend a wedding or family 
event and escapes, the family members who vouched for him have to take his place in 
prison (Boucek, 2008a). The second method occurs if a detainee reoffends. This involves 
taking away incentives provided to a detainee’s family while he is in the program and 
after he is released (Boucek, 2008a, 2009).   
The ultimate end is to reinforce the family building mechanism and make 
the value of family greater than that of violence. In the short-term, this mechanism 
creates a disengaging effect by leveraging cultural norms to apply pressure upon the 
individual. There is also the potential to have a more long-term effect. By reinforcing 
these same family values and norms, ideally, the detainee does not want to bring harm to 
his family by escaping or committing another offense  
c. Re-education 
Saudi Arabia works to re-educate individuals in three ways: the 
Counseling Program, the Tranquility Campaign, and clerical retraining. All three efforts 
aim to teach individuals the proper tenets of Islam and ultimately have these individuals 
renounce their previously held views. 
40 
 
The Advisory Committee was briefly described earlier. Thus far, 
approximately 3,000 detainees have participated in the Counseling Program. Of those, 
approximately 1,400 have been released while nearly 1,000 remain in prison. The 
1,000 that remain in prison consist of the few that have recidivated in addition to 
detainees that either failed or refused to participate in the program. Since the start of the 
program, the Ministry of Interior reported 60 incidents of recidivism, with recidivism 
being defined as incidents in which a detainee was released and subsequently re-arrested 
for taking part in terrorist activity. This equates to a two to four percent recidivism rate 
(Wagner, 2010).  
The Tranquility Campaign is similar to the Counseling Program in that it 
tries, through dialogue, to convince individuals to renounce their radical beliefs. 
However, this program works through the Internet. This program uses credible religious 
personnel and academic scholars who volunteer to enter known militant chat rooms. 
Once inside these chat rooms, they begin discussions about Islam and attempt to illustrate 
that what the extremists believe to be right is in fact incorrect. Through this “group” 
dialogue, volunteers will then work to pull individuals out into side chat rooms and 
continue the discussion (Ansary, 2008; Yehoshua, 2006). As of early 2008, almost 900 
individuals have renounced their previously held beliefs (Ansary, 2008).  
Finally, the last component of re-education is that of the radical low-level 
clerics throughout the kingdom. In addition to the firing of thousands discussed earlier, 
hundreds were sent to re-training or re-education programs (Ansary, 2008; Obaid & 
Cordesman, 2005; Oxford Analytica, 2005a; Peterson, 2007). Outside of these reports, 
there is no information on what exactly is involved in this particular component. 
4.  Collective Deradicalization 
Saudi Arabia utilizes four mechanisms within collective deradicalization: 





delegitimize the group. With these mechanisms Saudi Arabia aims to delegitimize 
everything about the group from its use of violence, its reasons for using violence, and 
those who are in or support the group.  
a.  Delegitimize Violence 
From the outset following the May 2003 bombings, the Saudi Council of 
Senior Ulema and the Grand Mufti have publicly condemned the violence to include the 
issuance of official fatwas condemning violence (Ansary, 2008; Oxford Analytica, 
2003b; Peterson, 2007; Reidel & Saab, 2008). The condemnation of violence has not 
been limited to just the top state sponsored clerics within the kingdom. Most clerics have 
denounced the violence to include dissident clerics who were opposed to the government 
(Hegghammer, 2010a; Oxford Analytica, 2005a; Peterson, 2007). Another component is 
the televised repentant clerics referenced earlier. Part of their repentance was retracting 
their previous verdicts on the use of violence. 
From a religious framework, the condemnation of violence by the top 
Sunni clerics, the dissident clerics, and those who previously supported violence makes 
the use of violence illegal. An important component of this mechanism for Saudi Arabia 
was gaining the support of the dissident clerics who were known to oppose the 
government. The support of the dissident clerics illustrated that violence within the 
kingdom was the greatest threat. 
b. Delegitimize Religious Leaders 
Initially, Saudi Arabia delegitimized religious leaders who supported 
violence in two ways. First, the government gained the support of dissident clerics. The 
partnership between the dissidents and the state drew a line in the sand. There were those 
who were against violence and those who supported violence. Violence was deemed as 
illegal; therefore, those who supported violence were also illegitimate. Members of the 
government and the Senior Ulema also spoke out against and criticized those who 
promoted violence (Glass & Yehoshua, 2008).  
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The second way Saudi Arabia delegitimized religious leaders was through 
the creation of an official website for the Senior Ulema. This website allowed for the 
publication of official fatwas. It also allowed for the Council of Senior Ulema to be asked 
a variety of questions by the public (Ansary, 2008). By creating the website, Saudi 
Arabia has marginalized all unauthorized or unqualified clerics. In reality, these are those 
clerics who are “not on the list.”  Now the government and the Council are able to 
regulate the interpretations and verdicts issued. Any fatwa published on the website, that 
all Muslims can access, take priority over anything a local cleric may issue. What is on 
the website is the correct interpretation of Islam. 
c. Environmental Manipulation 
AQAP wanted to “cleanse the Arabian Peninsula of Crusaders and 
Zionists” (Hegghammer, 2006a, p. 3; Oxford Analytica, 2006a, p. 1–2). This is also a 
common justification for joining AQAP (Hegghammer, 2006b). This desire to remove 
the U.S. and others from the Land of the Two Holy Places no doubt began during the 
First Gulf War. It increased over time especially as the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and 
Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively. As early as 2002, public opinion of the U.S. within 
Saudi Arabia came to the point where the “royal family [thought] its security [would be] 
best served by publicly distancing itself from the United States” (Hegghammer, 2010a, 
pp. 1782–1786). In April 2003, the U.S. announced, with the support and consent of 
Saudi Arabia, that it would withdraw U.S. forces from within Saudi Arabia (U.S. Pulls 
Out of Saudi Arabia, 2003; see also Kafala, 2003; Schmitt, 2003).  
The withdraw announcement preceded the bombing in May 2003. Thus, 
the Saudi government had removed AQAP’s ideological justification for the use of 
violence before the attacks began through the physical manipulation of the environment. 
AQAP continued to use this justification even after U.S. forces withdrew in the summer 
of 2003.   
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d. Delegitimize the Group 
Within this mechanism, Saudi Arabia utilized a media smear campaign to 
portray the AQAP organization in a negative light. This portrayal further discredited the 
group by using the group’s own actions against it. As AQAP’s operations continued and 
focused on attacking the security forces, the numbers of Saudi’s and Muslims killed or 
injured dramatically increased. This made it much easier for the Saudi government to 
depict the group as deviant rebels attempting to start a revolution whose main aim was to 
kill Muslims (Hegghammer, 2010b; Oxford Analytica, 2006a). Additionally, Saudi 
Arabia employed misinformation about AQAP stating that the militants had violated both 
the Qu’ran and mosques (Hegghammer, 2010b). Lastly, the government aired a show 
entitled Inside the Cell. This television show presented captured militants exposing how 
they were tricked into becoming members of AQAP. This further delegitimized the group 
by painting them as dishonest people whose cause was so illegitimate that they had to 
deceive their friends and family members into joining the group (Hegghammer, 2010a; 
Saudi Militants Shown Repenting on State TV, 2004). The picture painted by the 
government of AQAP flies in the face of Saudi cultural and religious norms, which 




Figure 3.   Saudi Arabia’s Effectiveness 
Much of Saudi Arabia’s effectiveness is within its efforts at individual 
deradicalization (see Figure 3). The Advisory Committee is very effective at changing the 
beliefs of those individuals who come through their program and at using other 
mechanisms to reinforce this success. However, there are a number of program graduates 
who have returned to violence elsewhere, but based on reporting that number is very 
small.  
Individual and collective disengagement are the next most effective LOEs within 
Saudi Arabia as illustrated in Figure 3. Most of the success lies in the more kinetic 
mechanisms used such as capture or kill, state repression, and target key leaders. More 
importantly, it was how these mechanisms were used that made these LOEs effective. 
Here, Saudi Arabia went to great lengths to be selective in the execution of these 
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mechanisms in order to prevent the effect of these repressive measures producing 
negative consequences upon its citizenry (Oxford Analytica, 2004c, 2006; Hegghammer, 
2006a, p. 5, 2010a, p. 19, 2010b, pp. 2659–2661).  
Finally, the least effective LOE for Saudi Arabia was collective deradicalization. 
Despite the success of Saudi Arabia in implementing the mechanisms within this LOE, it 
had little effect on deradicalizing AQAP. It did more to turn the population against the 
idea of using violence and, consequently, made the population unsupportive of violence 
within the kingdom.  
C. OUTCOME 
On 7 June 2006, King Abdullah announced that Saudi Arabia had defeated AQAP 
(Peterson, 2007, p. 40). There have been no major attacks within the kingdom since 2006 
(Saudi Arabia, 2011). The Ministry of Interior has continued operations against militants 
and occasionally announces large arrests (Glass & Yehoshua, 2008; Hegghammer, 
2010a; Reidel & Saab, 2008). Despite the continuance of those believe in violence, there 
remains little support for them within Saudi Arabia. 
Irrespective of the moderate effectiveness of Saudi’s overall efforts against 
AQAP, they did not bring about any substantial type of deradicalization. At most, Saudi 
Arabia achieved the organizational level of deradicalization—the dismantlement of the 
organization to carry out violence (Ashour, 2009, p. 6). The breakdown of AQAP was 
done largely through targeting the leadership and selective state repression against the 
group. The successive losses of strong leaders coupled with repressive, yet selective 
crackdowns against the group eliminated the organization’s ability to function or recover 
forcing those who had not been detained or killed to flee the country.  
D.  CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s ability to bring about organizational 
deradicalization and collective disengagement of AQAP, the success achieved was 
limited to within the borders of Saudi Arabia. The AQAP members who had not been 
detained or killed simply fled the country to Yemen. Essentially, Saudi Arabia “kicked 
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the can down the street,” forcing Yemen to deal with the problem as evidenced in that 
country’s current fight against the Yemeni version of AQAP.   
Understanding the local and purely domestic nature of the Saudi Arabian 
deradicalization campaign, the Saudi government has achieved varying degrees of 
success within all four LOEs. Specifically, this campaign has been effective in bringing 
about collective disengagement within the borders of Saudi Arabia. The government also 
has used a variety of mechanisms in each of the four LOEs against AQAP. Through the 
combination of mechanisms implemented across all four LOEs, Saudi Arabia applied 
pressure on AQAP and, in turn, significantly reduced the ability of the organization to 
conduct attacks. Admittedly, however, AQAP was still able to conduct various attacks 
between 2003 and 2007 before the remnants fled to Yemen. In addition to disrupting the 
group’s ability to conduct attacks, the government largely delegitimized the group, its use 
of violence, its religious leaders, and removed the justification for the use of violence. 
Despite Saudi’s apparent success at executing these collective deradicalization 
mechanisms, they had minimal effect in bringing about any type of ideological change 
within the group itself. Ultimately, AQAP had limited ability to conduct operations and 





A.  BACKGROUND 
Yemen is no stranger to militants within its borders. The country first saw an 
influx of mujahedin fighters following the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan 
(Hull, 2011, p. xxvi; Sharp, 2011, p. 13). Yemen has also seen its land used by terrorists 
in attacks against the United States (U.S.). Early attacks against the U.S. included: the 
1992 al-Qa’ida (AQ) attacks against U.S. soldiers in Aden (Hull, 2011, p. xxviii; 
Schanzen, 2005, p. 76); the 1998 attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa, Nairobi and 
Dar es Saleem, where Yemen was used as a jump off point (Hull, 2011, p. xxviii); and 
the 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden (Hull, 2011, p. xxviii; Clark, 2010, p. 172). A more 
recent attack emanating from Yemen is the failed 2009 underwear bombing of Northwest 
Flight 253 (Ashenfelter, 2012). Aside from attacks targeting U.S. interest, Yemen 
received its fair share of domestic attacks targeting infrastructure, tourism, and 
government officials (Hull, 2011; Clark, 2010). 
Generally, Yemen has done little except to placate a variety of groups that have 
operated within its borders. There are two time periods that serve as exceptions. The first 
was from roughly 2000 to 2003. The second began in 2006 and continues to present day. 
These periods mark the “two distinct phases of war against al-Qaeda[sic] in Yemen” 
(Johnsen, 2010a, p. 6). The first phase stemmed from U.S. pressure on Yemen following 
the Cole bombing and the 9/11 attacks (Johnsen, 2010a, p. 7; Cordesman & al-Rodhan, 
2006, p. 23). The second phase, caused by a greater degree of U.S. pressure, has 
compelled the Yemeni government to actively respond to terrorism against the regime. 
Most experts argue that the radical groups operating inside Yemen have lineage to 
AQ (Johnsen, 2010a, p. 7; Hill & Nonneman, 2011, p. 15). The first of these groups was 
Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY) from 1990–1994 (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 21). 
Associates of, and Arab-Afghans who fought with, bin Laden in Afghanistan started this 




created the Army of Aden-Abyan (AAA), which operated from 1994–1998 (Koehler-
Derrick, 2011, p. 21). Following AAA came al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY) from 1998–2003 
(Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 21). 
The more recent al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) officially began in 
2009 with the merger of fleeing Saudi AQ militants11 with Yemeni AQ militants inside 
Yemen (Swift, 2012, p. 2). However, the group really started in 2006 with the escape of 
23 militants from a Sana’a prison (Johnsen, 2010b, p. 1). AQAP underwent a series of 
name changes12 between 2006 and 2009; however, most know the group simply as 
AQAP. In addition to AQAP “proper,” a second, apparently separate, group emerged in 
the early period following the prison escape: AQAP—Soldiers Brigade of Yemen (SBY), 
which operated from 2006 to 2008 (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 38). 
In dealing with these different groups, Yemen has used a variety of mechanisms. 
Yemen “successfully” dealt with four groups; however, the most current group, AQAP, 
remains active. With this, the following case study seeks to determine the effectiveness of 
Yemeni deradicalization efforts. 
B.  LINES OF EFFORT 
1.  Individual Disengagement 
Within individual disengagement, the Yemeni government has utilized five 
mechanisms: capture or kill, promote marriage, provide job opportunities, detainee 
release, and publication of militants’ names. All of these mechanisms aim to stop the 
behavior of individuals in their efforts against the state. 
                                                 
11 The Saudi militants were fleeing Saudi Arabia as a result of that country’s significant efforts to 
defeat its version (the original version) of AQAP (Horton, 2010, p. 2). 
12 AQAP, the Yemeni version, originally began under the name al-Qa’ida in the Land of Yemen 
(AQLY) (2006-2007). The group then changed to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula—Land of Yemen 
(AQAP-LY) in 2008. Followed by al-Qa’ida in the Southern Arabian Peninsula (AQSAP) in 2008. Finally 
reaching al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) beginning in 2009 to present day (Koehler-Derrick, 
2011, p. 13). 
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a. Capture or Kill 
Prior to the first phase of AQ, there appears to be limited capturing or 
killing of terrorists inside of Yemen. It was not until the USS Cole bombing, the M/V 
Limburg bombing, and 9/11 that Yemen became serious about trying to capture or kill 
terrorists operating within the borders (Hull, 2011). Initial efforts focused on mass arrests 
of anyone sympathetic toward or associated with al-Qa’ida (Johnsen, 2007a, 2010a, 
2010a; Oxford Analytica, 2004c; Taarnby, 2005b, p. 130). The Yemeni government is 
not opposed to killing terrorists during its operations either. The killing of terrorists has 
taken place during numerous operations that persist to the present (Boucek, 2010a; 
Department of State, 2012, p. 124; Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity, 2010a, 2012; 
Schanzen, 2005, p. 82). 
Furthermore, Yemen has moved beyond just detaining its own citizens. 
Yemen has sought to detain foreigners inside of the country suspected of ties to or 
involvement with terrorist organizations. Following their detention, Yemen has deported 
these individuals to their country of origin (Boucek, 2010a, p. 5; Clark, 2010, p. 192; 
Johnson, 2009; Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity, 2010b; Schanzen, 2005, p. 82). 
One prominent example is the arrest of New Jersey resident, Sharif Mobley, who was 
detained in March 2010 (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 51; Sharp, 2011, p. 18).  
Another tactic used by the Yemeni government is the arrest of militants’ 
family members (Birk, 2009, p. 8; Clark, 2010, p. 230). Yemen uses the family members 
as “hostages,” holding the family members without trial until the wanted militants turn 
themselves in (Clark, 2010, p. 230).  
By capturing or killing the militants, Yemen is able to physically remove 
these individuals and prevent them from conducting additional attacks against the state. 
Those incarcerated remain in prison unable to conduct attacks. Arguably, however, the 
detention of family members is the least effective. Such arbitrary arrests are a human 
rights violation (United Nations, 2012). These types of arrests could, quite possibly, serve 




b. Promote Marriage 
Graduates of the Committee for Dialogue (CFD),13 which operated from 
2002 to 2005, were encouraged to marry. If necessary the state financed the marriages 
(Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15). In addition to paying for the wedding, the state provided 
an assistance package that contained basic cooking commodities to help the new couple 
get started (Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15). 
Yemen seeks to provide the individual with something to do—provide for 
a family—as a socially acceptable alternative to violence. However, in the case of 
Yemen, the one-time stipend that was provided to released graduates quickly ran out. 
Without money, marriage became a liability. This prompted many to return to terrorist 
violence in order to earn money to support their family (Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15). 
c. Job Opportunities 
Early on, the Yemeni government provided a number of jobs to fighters 
upon their return from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. These jobs were typically 
rolled into the country’s security forces (Sharp, 2011, p. 13). The former president, Ali 
Abdullah Salih, even offered government jobs to IJY members in an effort to persuade 
those individuals to disengage from violence (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 26). The CFD 
program assisted released detainees with jobs (Al-Hitar, 2011, p. 120). Attempts were 
made to return the individual to his previous job, if he had one (Fink & El-Said, 2011, 
p. 15; Taarnby, 2005a, p. 3). However, difficulties in finding employment existed due to 
the detainees’ lack of qualifications (Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15). Consequently, 
graduates who took jobs ended up in the government, specifically the military and 
security services (Johnsen & Boucek, 2010, p. 25; National Security Initiative, 2010, 
p. 27; Taarnby, 2005a, p. 3; Westervelt, 2005, p. 2).  
This provided many militants with an alternate activity besides violence 
against the state and created a link between the government and the individual that 
                                                 




facilitated disengagement. The government provided a job, a paycheck, and subsequently, 
an incentive not to commit violence. Unfortunately, there are no indications that the 
government ever provided any type of job training or religious education. This led the 
government to put most militants into the military and security services, which created a 
problem for Yemen. Clark (2010) states, “Yemen’s security services, the Political 
Security Organization (PSO), was itself a bastion of anti-western, tending towards pro-
jihadist feeling, staffed as it was in large part by retired Afghan War veterans” (p. 170). 
The “pro-jihadist feeling” has led some to believe that the PSO actually facilitated, or 
turned a blind-eye to, the 2006 prison escape, which took place from a PSO prison in 
Sana’a (Johnsen, 2010b, p. 1). 
d. Detainee Release 
Through the CFD, if one renounced violence and signed a pledge, then he 
would be released from prison (Al-Hitar, 2011, p. 119; Birk, 2009, p. 10; Johnsen & 
Boucek, 2010, p. 25; Porges, 2010, p. 28; Schanzen, 2005, p. 84). Of those who went 
through the program between 2002 and 2005, 364 were released (Horgan & Braddock, 
2010, p. 276; Johnsen & Boucek, 2010, p. 25; Westervelt, 2005, p. 2). The individual’s 
release creates a “contract” between the Yemeni government and the released detainee. 
The individual is supposed to refrain from violence and remain loyal to the government. 
If the individual violates this contract and returns to violence, the state is authorized to 
arrest or kill him. 
In order for the government to ensure that the contract is upheld, the 
government must monitor released detainees. Those released from prison following the 
CFD program were monitored for a period of time following their release (Al-Hitar, 
2011, p. 119; Taarnby, 2005a, p. 2; Westervelt, 2005, p. 2). It does not appear that much 
effort went into monitoring released detainees due to the government’s inability to do so 
(Schanzen, 2005, p. 84). Additionally, there is the issue of the pro-jihadist leaning PSO as 
discussed above. One can easily argue that little effort was made by the PSO to monitor 
these particular detainees. Finally, during the time frame of the program’s existence, 
Operation IRAQ FREEDOM (OIF) started in 2003. A large number of the released 
52 
 
detainees are suspected of travelling to Iraq and fighting against the coalition (Porges, 
2010, p. 28; Porges & Alley, 2010). Reverting to violence technically violates the 
contract; however, there is no indication that the pledge made any stipulation concerning 
the use of violence outside of the country (Porges, 2010, p. 28; Porges & Alley, 2010).  
e. Publication of Militants’ Names 
As early as 2003, Yemen has published the names of some of the wanted 
militants operating inside of the country (Hull, 2011, p. 84; Johnsen, 2007b; NSI, 2010, 
p. 30). In addition to publicizing the names of operatives, the Yemeni government has, in 
at least two cases, offered a reward for information leading to the capture of specific 
militants (Hull, 2011, p. 84; Johnsen, 2007b, 2007c). 
The publication of the names makes it difficult for those militants to 
operate inside of the country. More time is spent hiding one’s self and activities versus 
actually conducting violence. Adding the reward makes providing information to the 
government a greater incentive, especially in Yemen, which is the poorest Arab country 
and has a 35 percent unemployment rate (Boucek, 2010b, p. 2, 11). This mechanism has 
worked and encouraged Yemeni citizens to provide information to the government on 
suspected militants, which facilitated government operations (Hull, 2011, p. 60, 73, 83; 
Johnsen, 2010a, p. 16).  
2. Collective Disengagement 
Yemen used six mechanisms under collective disengagement: state repression, 
targeting key leaders, amnesty, surrenders, political inclusion, and negotiations. These 
mechanisms aim to prevent the group from using violence. 
a. State Repression 
In the fight against AQ, Yemen, as seen through the capture or kill 
discussed earlier, has cracked down on militants operating inside of the country 
(Analysis-Yemen Crackdown, 2010; Johnsen, 2007c; Schanzen, 2005, p. 81; Westervelt, 
2005, p. 2). The government typically uses large-scale operations that can involve police, 
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security services, and/or military power (DOS, 2012, pp. 124–125; Koehler-Derrick, 
2011, pp. 27–28; NSI, 2010, p. 27; Oxford Analytica, 2006b; Schanzen, 2005, p. 83; 
Sharp, 2011, p. 25).  
State repression demonstrates the state’s ability to apply pressure on a 
group. The repression forces a group to focus on avoiding the repressive measures vice 
conducting violence. However, large-scale operations are seen as severe and heavy-
handed (Johnson, 2009, p. 14; Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 144, 148). The apparent 
indiscriminate nature of these large-scale operations has caused significant collateral 
damage, specifically the use of air strikes (Hull, 2011, p. 119; Koehler-Derrick, 2011, 
p. 5). One reported incident indicated that along with five AQ militants, there were a 
number of women and children killed (Hull, 2011, p. 119). These types of mistakes have 
continued to present day. In September 2012, Yemeni military aircraft attacked vehicles 
thought to be carrying AQAP operatives. However, the vehicles were carrying civilians 
including women and children (Associated Press, 2012). These types of operations anger 
local tribes and turn the population against the government (Hull, 2011, p. 42, 119–120). 
b. Targeting Key Leaders 
Yemen has successfully targeted the leaders of three groups: AAA, AQY, 
and SBY. The removal of strong and or charismatic leaders disrupts the organization’s 
ability to plan and conduct operations and removes the agent holding the organization 
together. Yemen has had limited success against AQAP. 
Following the AAA’s kidnapping of tourists in 1998 and Yemen’s failed 
operation to rescue the hostages, Yemen did succeed in capturing the leader of AAA, 
Zain al-Abidin al-Midhar. His arrest allowed for an immediate trial, conviction, and 
execution by firing squad in October 1999. Al-Midhar’s death essentially marked the end 
of AAA (Clark, 2010, p. 168; Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, 2006, p. 26; Hull, 2011, p. 27; 
Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 30; Schanzen, 2005, p. 78). 
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AQY received their defeat in two blows. The first came in November 
2002 when a U.S. drone14 fired a missile killing the leader of AQY, Abu Ali Al-Harithi 
(Johnsen, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2010a, p. 9, 2010c, 2010d; NSI, 2010, p. 26; 
Oxford Analytica, 2007, Sharp, 2011). The second blow came in November 2003 when 
Yemen security forces managed to arrest al-Harithi’s replacement, Muhammad al-Ahdal 
(Johnsen, 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, p. 9, 2010b, 2010c; Oxford Analytica, 2006b; Schanzen, 
2005, p. 86). The successive blows against AQY leadership combined with the state 
repression and capture or kill mechanisms brought this group to an end. Most of its rank-
and-file members were either in jail or dead. Following the removal of AQY’s primary 
leaders, there was no one to plan or coordinate operations; nor was there anyone to help 
hold the organization together. 
SBY’s short-lived existence ceased with the elimination of their leader, 
Hamza Salim ‘Umar al-Qu’ayti, in 2008. Yemeni security forces conducting a raid killed 
al-Qu’ayti along with four others (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 5, 38–39). Following his 
death, no one in the group stepped up to take charge. 
AQAP’s leadership appears to have proven a more difficult target for both 
Yemen and the U.S. There have been a number of successful strikes against high-level 
AQAP leaders and operatives; however, the group continues to function with relative 
ease. Two familiar examples of successful strikes are those against Anwar al-Awlaki and 
Samir Khan (DOS, 2012, p. 5, 124, 256; Johnsen, 2012; Traub, 2012a). Despite 
achieving success on a number of ranking militants, to include the recent elimination of 
AQAP’s second-in-command, Saeed al-Shihri, on 10 September 2012 (Al-Haj & Baldor, 
2010), the state has been unable to remove the head of AQAP, Nasir al-Wahayshi 
(Johnsen, 2008). This provides the remainder of the organization with a core cadre that 
can still provide direction and motivation. 
                                                 
14 The strike by an unmanned aerial vehicle or drone was authorized by the Yemeni government in 
2002 (Clark, 2010, p. 194; Hill & Nonneman, 2011, p. 16; Johnsen, 2010c; Oxford Analytica, 2006b; 
Sharp, 2011, pp. 15-16). This marks the beginning of “offensive” cooperation between the two 
governments. This cooperation, specifically the drone strikes, but also includes other forms of assistance, 
continues to the present day even under the new Yemeni President, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi (Traub, 
2012a). With this in mind, the authors consider U.S. drone strikes inside Yemen a component of the 




The Yemeni government, under former President Salih, has used 
negotiation extensively. This took the form of three components:  non-aggression pacts, 
amnesty, and surrender.   
(1) Non-Aggression Pacts. Initially, this took the form of a 
non-aggression pact with the mujahedin that flowed into Yemen in the early 1990s. This 
negotiation, and subsequent agreement, amounted to the mujahedin’s assistance in 
fighting Yemen’s internal conflicts and not conducting attacks inside or against the 
country in return for safe haven inside of Yemen (NSI, 2010, p. 26). 
Another component of this form of negotiation came about after 
the start of OIF. Here, the Yemeni government negotiated to allow the movement of 
Yemeni jihadists to Iraq as long as there were no attacks against Yemen’s interests 
(Clark, 2010, p. 227). Also included in the negotiation was the stipulation that Yemen 
would not target jihadists, nor would the government extradite jihadists to the U.S. 
(Clark, 2010, p. 282).  
The government also used negotiations with specific terrorist 
groups operating within the country in order to cease their operations. However, the 
government’s attempts to negotiate with specific groups did not produce the desired 
effects. Yemen has attempted to negotiate with IJY, AAA, and even called for dialogue 
with AQAP (Peterson, 2010, p. 2). Both negotiations with IJY15 and AAA failed 
(Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 25, 27–28). AQAP has flatly rejected any attempts to 
negotiate by the government and has even warned older jihadists about the consequences 
of being caught negotiating with the government (Johnsen, 2007c, 2008, 2010a, p. 13). 
(2) Amnesty. An aspect of negotiations used by the Yemeni 
government is that of amnesty. In conducting negotiations with individuals or groups, the 
government has typically offered some form of amnesty (Horton, 2010, p. 3). In return 
                                                 
15 Negotiations with IJY initially failed; however, Yemen did have success negotiating, specifically 
with the leadership on an individual level, which did have collective effects. These effects will be discussed 




for the amnesty, groups or individuals are expected to refrain from violence against the 
state. This reportedly worked with a portion of AAA following an offer of amnesty to the 
group resulting in more 50 members of the group surrendering (Schanzen, 2005, p. 84). 
If the offer of amnesty is successful, it can significantly disrupt the 
group’s operational capacity. Not only does it take away fighters from the group, it 
creates an operational security risk for the organization. The group now has to focus on 
determining what information about the group is being divulged; changing group habits 
and tactics, techniques, and procedures; and trying to determine future group defectors. 
Emphasis on conducting operations is significantly reduced while the organization takes 
an introspective look at its members. 
(3) Surrenders. A number of individual militants have 
surrendered to include some of the 23 escapees who absconded in February 2006 
(Johnsen, 2007d). Surrenders have typically been a part of a negotiation process between 
the government and an individual. This process involves an exchange of money and the 
mediator placing his reputation on the line (Johnsen, 2007d). Then as part of the 
arrangement, the detained militant is released on house arrest where he will remain as 
long as he does not commit any crimes (Johnsen, 2007d). 
This works at an individual level, however it does have a collective 
effect. The effect of surrenders is similar to the amnesty mechanism. Initially, it takes 
fighters away from the group. The surrenders then force the group to look inward and 
focus on the potential operational security risks that have developed. 
d. Political Inclusion 
There has been only one instance of political inclusion by the Yemeni 
government, which was with IJY. As part of negotiation efforts with the IJY leadership, 
Tariq al-Fadhli and Jamal al-Nahdi were placed in positions with the government—along 
with other incentives—as long as they denounced violence and broke up IJY (Koehler-
Derrick, 2011, pp. 24–25). Al-Fadhli, specifically, was provided with membership in the 




house (Clark, 2010, pp. 164–165). Former President Salih offered government positions 
to other members of the group, however, many turned down the offer (Koehler-Derrick, 
2011, p. 26).  
Through the inclusion of the IJY leaders into the political system, the 
Yemeni government has disengaged the two individuals who controlled IJY. Ideally, one 
cannot conduct violence against the state when one is part of the state. The 
disengagement of the leaders also has a disengaging effect upon the group in three ways. 
First, the former leadership, as part of the deal, has to break up the group and facilitate 
collective disengagement (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, pp. 24–25). Second, members now 
have to stop and re-evaluate their use of violence as they watch their former leaders 
become part of the state in which they were fighting. This period of re-evaluation is 
where the group is disengaged. Finally, the IJY had grievances with the state that were 
not being addressed. By having their leadership inside the political system, the IJY, in 
essence, now has a voice within that same system allowing them to effectively 
communicate their issues to the state. 
3. Individual Deradicalization 
Individual deradicalization aims to change an individual’s belief in the use of 
violence. Yemen uses two mechanisms under individual deradicalization: re-education 
and community responsibility. 
a. Re-education 
The Committee for Dialogue program ran from 2002 to 2005 under the 
direction of Judge Hamoud al-Hitar; this program started as a result of the mass arrests 
conducted by Yemeni security forces (al-Hitar, 2011). Prisons had become crowded and 
Yemen was searching for a way to ease the pressure within the prisons (Johnson, 2009, 
pp. 13–14; Taarnby, 2005a). At the direction of former President Salih, al-Hitar started 
the program using dialogue with suspected militants to challenge and debate their radical 
ideology. During the dialogue, groups of militants would go through a series of sessions 
with al-Hitar and his committee. While in these sessions, each side would justify their 
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position on a number of issues using only the Qu’ran and hadiths.16  Following the 
successful completion of the program, detainees were released if they had not committed 
any violent crimes. Following their release, the state provided surveillance of the released 
detainees as well as a one-time stipend, assistance in getting a job, and help with 
marriage (al-Hitar, 2011; Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 275; Porges, 2010; Taarnby, 
2005).  
Despite the apparent success of the program touted by al-Hitar (2011), 
much remains to be seen as Yemen has yet to publish any reports or statistics on the 
program (Johnson, 2009, p. 17; Porges, 2010, p. 28). One of the issues with the CFD is 
that, upfront, it presented detainees with the knowledge that if they went through the 
program, renounced violence, and pledged obedience to the state and/or Salih they would 
be released (Birk, 2009, p. 4, 10; Johnsen & Boucek, 2010; Porges & Alley, 2010). 
Immediately, detainees knew they just needed to bide their time, say the right words, and 
they would be released. Second, those who went through the program were reportedly 
sympathizers versus hard-core militants (Birk 2009, p. 8; Eaves, 2004). More 
importantly, these sympathizers were not separated from the general prison population of 
radical militants. During the day, they received their re-education, while at night they 
received a course in militancy. This negated any progress that may have been made by 
the Committee. Finally, of the 364 released through the program, a number of the 
reformed individuals travelled to Iraq and were found fighting the coalition; these actions 
dispute the effectiveness of the program (Johnson, 2009, p. 17; Porges, 2010; Porges & 
Alley, 2010, Taarnby, 2005b).  
                                                 
16 The topics discussed during the dialogue sessions were: 
• The concept of the state, government, Islamic succession and rights of others. 
• Jihad in Islam: what (its rules), when, how, where, and who (has the right to announce it) 
• Commitment to the constitution and the laws that are in effect 
• Muslim’s relationship with others 
• The rights of non-Muslims in Muslim countries 
• Actions and implication that disrupt the security and stability of the country 
• Ostracizing violence, extremism, and terrorism 
• Unbelief and migration (Al-Hitar, 2011, p. 117) 
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b. Community Responsibility 
Yemen has strong cultural norms about familial and tribal relations and 
the notion of honor. Yemen attempts to capitalize on this by making the family or tribe 
responsible for a detainee once he is released. This is done by having the family use their 
home or business as collateral in order to sign for the detainee upon his release 
(Schanzen, 2005, p. 84; Westervelt, 2005). 
The idea behind the concept is that if the detainee re-offends he will bring 
shame upon his family and tribe because they have given their word that the detainee will 
not commit crimes. Not only would the family or tribe member’s honor come into 
question, but they could also lose their home or business if the detainee re-offended. 
Initially, this works as a disengagement mechanism, however the effect of placing the 
family or tribe’s honor on the line is to make those tribal norms more valued than the use 
of violence. Committing violence is no longer worth harming the family or tribe.  
Unfortunately, it does not appear that this has worked with much success 
considering that a number of the released detainees from the CFD were found fighting in 
Iraq. However, because Iraq was seen as a justified front, Yemen may still mark this as a 
successful mechanism because the use of violence was not against the state. 
4. Collective Deradicalization 
Yemen utilizes two mechanisms within collective deradicalization: influence or 
co-opt the leaders and delegitimize violence. With these mechanisms Yemen aims to 
delegitimize the group and its use of violence. 
a. Influence or Co-opt the Leaders 
As discussed earlier, the Yemeni government did conduct negotiations 
with IJY. Negotiations with the group by and large did not work very well; however, 
Yemeni efforts to co-opt the leaders, Tariq al-Fadhli and Jamal al-Nahdi, did work. Both 
leaders were offered government jobs (Clark, 2010, pp. 164–165; Koehler-Derrick, 2011, 
pp. 24–25). Al-Fadhli also received membership in the GPC and a seat in Parliament 
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(Clark, 2010, pp. 164–165), which facilitates the political inclusion mechanism discussed 
earlier. Additionally, Al-Fadhli received a paycheck, a vehicle, military rank as the 
commander of the Second Army Brigade, and the return of his family lands (Clark, 2010, 
pp. 164–165).  
In exchange for the incentives, al-Fadhli and al-Nahdi disbanded and 
renounced IJY (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, pp. 25–26). By renouncing the group, the leaders 
delegitimized the group. This forces the group, specifically the rank-and-file 
membership, to re-evaluate their belief system and their justification for the use of 
violence. The leaders were the ones who created the belief system and promoted the use 
of violence against the state. Now, those same leaders have deemed that the previously 
held beliefs were incorrect. Initially, this creates a collective disengagement effect as the 
members take an introspective look; however, as they accept the leaders’ new views it 
can become collective deradicalization. 
b. Delegitimize Violence 
Following the attacks by AQ affiliated groups within Yemen during the 
first phase; the Yemeni government was able to successfully use the media to sway 
popular opinion against the terrorist group (Hull, 2011, p. 59, 78). Specifically, the 
terrorist attack on the M/V Limburg turned most Yemenis against the groups. The oil 
tanker had no military value and was not directly tied to the government. Yemen’s oil 
exports constitute approximately 75 percent of the country’s revenue (Boucek, 2010b, 
p. 4). The Limburg provided an economic line facilitating domestic revenue. Attacking 
this ship eliminated a portion of the funds coming into the country. Additionally, it 
polluted the harbor and disrupted local fishing by depriving fisherman their main source 
of income (Hull, 2011, p. 57, 59, 78).  
During the first phase, former President Salih publicly spoke out against 
terrorism in a meeting he hosted for prominent political and tribal figures (Hull, 2011, 
p. 29). Salih also commissioned his Ministry of Interior to produce and publish a work 
highlighting the negative effects of past terrorist incidents in the country. The end result 
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was the work titled, Terror in Yemen (Hull, 2011, p. 68). Additionally, opposition forces, 
namely Salafists, spoke out against the use of violence whether against the state or 
against the coalition in Iraq (Bonnefoy, 2010, p. 16). 
The Yemeni government and political opposition forces continue to speak 
out against the use of violence (DOS, 2012, p. 127). However, this does not appear to 
have the same effect it did from 2000–2003. More than likely, this is due to the type of 
targets that were attacked. During that time period, many selected targets were not 
government related targets and they adversely affected the population. This drove the 
government and the population together in the struggle against violence resulting in 
citizens reporting on suspicious activity or persons (Hull, 2011, p. 60, 68, 73, 83, 90; 
Johnsen, 2010a, p. 16). 
 
Figure 4.   Yemen’s Effectiveness 
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Overall, much of Yemen’s effectiveness rests in its ability to disengage both 
individuals and groups. More specifically, much of the country’s success lies in its ability 
to disengage groups from violent behavior as illustrated in Figure 4 within the collective 
disengagement quadrant. Yemen’s success within this LOE has been shown through their 
defeat of AAA, AQY, and SBY primarily through targeting key leaders and state 
repression mechanisms. Yemen was somewhat successful under individual 
disengagement as shown in Figure 4. Yemen’s effectiveness here is within the capture or 
kill mechanism. However, their method for utilizing this mechanism, specifically the 
mass arrests, is what ultimately diminishes the effectiveness for this LOE. As described 
earlier, Yemen utilized wide sweeping mass arrests, which included family members of 
wanted militants. This initially disengaged those who were arrested, but ultimately 
pushed individuals who may have been neutral to the side of the militants. 
Under deradicalization, Yemen scored more effective under collective 
deradicalization for their efforts against IJY as pictured in Figure 4. Yemen did achieve 
some level of success in deradicalizing this particular group, which was primarily 
accomplished through efforts to influence or co-opt the leadership. However, this is 
where Yemen’s success stops. Yemen has had little success since IJY to influence or co-
opt the leadership of any other group. Of all the LOEs, individual deradicalization is the 
least effective within the context of Yemen as shown in Figure 4. Despite their efforts to 
stand-up an actual program to work on changing the beliefs of individuals, little evidence 
exists to support any real success. There has, however, been a fair amount of evidence to 
suggest that a number of the graduates were fighting in Iraq during OIF highlighting the 
fact that those individuals still held their beliefs in the use of violence.  
C. OUTCOME 
In Yemen, IJY reached the pragmatic type of deradicalization, composed of both 
behavioral and organizational levels of deradicalization (Ashour, 2009, p. 6). By 
negotiating, including the leaders in the political system, and co-opting the leaders of IJY, 
the Yemeni government was able to bring about behavioral deradicalization, which is the 
abandonment of violence in pursuit of political goals (Ashour, 209, p. 6). Yemen did 
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achieve organizational deradicalization, which is the dismantlement of the organization to 
carry out violence without splits and factions (Ashour, 2009, p. 6). Using the 
aforementioned mechanisms that focused on the leadership coupled with state repression, 
capture or kill, amnesty, and job opportunities facilitated this. However, Yemen only 
achieved limited success under organizational deradicalization due to IJY members who 
were in hiding from state repression that did not follow the IJY leadership and coalesced 
to form AAA (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 21). Despite attaining pragmatic 
deradicalization, there is no evidence to support any efforts to delegitimize the use of 
violence, ideologically, by the IJY leaders following their renunciation of violence. 
Yemen only realized organizational deradicalization with AAA, AQY, and SBY. 
All three of these groups came to an end following Yemen’s successful effort to target 
the leadership in which the leadership was either captured or killed. The removal of the 
leadership coupled with ongoing state repression to capture/kill the remainder of the 
group facilitated organizational dissolution within all three groups. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Over the years, Yemen has had mixed results in dealing with terrorist 
organizations. To some degree, Yemen deradicalized IJY, while only disengaging AAA, 
SBY, and AQY through defeat. Yemen’s efforts against AQAP continue today with very 
limited progress. 
Overall, efforts focused on the leaders appear to have had greater effects against 
radical groups operating inside of Yemen. In the case of AAA, AQY, and SBY, Yemen 
managed to defeat these groups, or collectively disengage them, through targeting the key 
leaders. The removal of leadership from each of these groups brought about their end. 
IJY, on the other hand, was collectively disengaged through the use of political inclusion 
of the IJY leadership and, subsequently, deradicalized through the influence and co-
option of the IJY leadership.  
However, mechanisms aimed at leadership must be used in conjunction with some 
level of state repression or capture/kill and other mechanisms that create incentives, such 
64 
 
as amnesty. Without the repressive measures, no push factor would exist to facilitate the 
pull factor of incentives such as political inclusion and co-option of the leadership as seen 
with IJY. Additionally, in the case of Yemen, efforts that allowed the leadership to 
remain, allowing the leaders to exert some level of control over members, had greater 
deradicalization effects versus simply capturing or killing the leaders. The latter, 
specifically killing, removes the ability of the leader to influence deradicalization efforts 






In Indonesia, terrorism perpetrated by radical Islamist groups represents a serious 
threat to local and regional stability. This terror landscape contains the following groups: 
Mujahidin KOMPAK, KOMPAK, Front Pembala Islam, Committee for the Enforcement 
of Islamic Law, Laskar Jundullah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, AMIN, Ring Banten, and Jemaah 
Islamiyah (Oak, 2010, pp. 1017–1018). While most of these groups maintain a rather 
narrow strategy and focus on agendas framed around domestic matters, Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) has emerged as the most formidable and dangerous organization by extending its 
strategic focus and operational reach to not only Indonesia, but throughout all of 
Southeast Asia as well. Because of its propensity for catastrophic violence and aspiration 
for regional relevance and expansion, the remainder of this chapter will primarily focus 
on JI.   
JI has conducted large-scale violence across Southeast Asia, since 2000. The 
origins of JI can be traced back to the early 1960s when its two co-founders and spiritual 
leaders, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, met. Ba’asyir and Sungkar formally 
organized JI in Malaysia the early 1990s with the strategic goal of establishing an Islamic 
Caliphate first in Indonesia, and eventually throughout Southeast Asia. JI moved to 
Indonesia after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998 (Barton, 2004, pp. 13–15) and 
orchestrated twenty catastrophic terrorist attacks that resulted in 310 civilian deaths and 
1,157 wounded casualties from 2000 to 2009, JI (Oak, 2010, p. 997). 
In response to the JI bomb attacks in Bali on 12 October 2002—a series of near-
simultaneous blasts that killed 202 people—the Indonesia security apparatus realized the 
need to implement deradicalization programs. Detachment 88 (Det 88), Indonesia’s 
premier domestic counterterrorism force, unilaterally seized the initiative and began to 
develop and implement an assortment of hard and soft approaches aimed at 
disengagement and deradicalization (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 106). While some of Det 88’s 
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activities target the collective level of JI and associated groups, the majority of them seek 
to influence the behavior and ideology of the individual terrorist. 
The primary goal of the Det 88 program is to facilitate the disengagement of 
individual jihadists so as to prevent further terrorist attacks from occurring. A November 
2007 International Crisis Group assessment supports this assertion by stating that 
selective incentives in the form of economic aid is “ultimately more important” 
(International Crisis Group, 2007, Executive Summary) than religious arguments in 
efforts change the attitudes of Indonesian jihadists (ICG, 2007, Executive Summary). 
Thus, Detachment 88 primarily uses material resources to change jihadist behavior rather 
than engaging in religious/ideological dialogue. 
A summary of the Det 88 strategic intentions for the Indonesian deradicalization 
program is contained in the following quote: 
Success is primarily based on actual organizational capacity in terms of 
forming horizontal and vertical networks of moderate forces. This is also 
combined with the ability to find new and innovative ways of 
communicating the ‘countermessage.’  A combination of a credible and 
effective message on the one hand and the ‘right’ messenger on the other 
makes this happen. (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 8) 
Thus, Ranstorp (2009) alludes to a few essential components of the Det 88 
deradicalization program—delivering the JI counter-message through innovative means 
and utilizing credible, respected interlocutors as the mouthpiece for the program. These 
two components represent the heart of the Det 88 deradicalization program and the 
foundation from which the program’s successes and failures can be identified from the 
analysis of the four LOEs that follow.  
B. LINES OF EFFORT 
1. Individual Disengagement 
Regarding the individual disengagement LOE, the Det 88 deradicalization 
program largely focuses on the implementation of selective incentives (job opportunities, 
job training, various forms of financial compensation) and the manipulation of exclusive 
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jihadist social networks. By enlisting the help of Nasir Abas, a former mantiqi 
commander, and Ali Imron, a key JI member involved in 2002 Bali bombings, Det 88 
attempts to gain access into some of JI’s inner circles in order to set the conditions for 
individual JI members to disengage and refrain from further acts of violence. Selective 
incentives and social networks serve as the two key tenets of the Indonesian program, for 
only radicals can directly influence jihadi prisoners because they possess the requisite 
credibility (through social networks); the state must re-establish trust and legitimacy 
(through selective incentives) in order to establish an environment conducive to 
cooperation by individual terrorists (Speckhard, 2011, p. 11–6).    
a. Selective Incentives 
Conceptually, selective incentives can be viewed as the job opportunities 
and job training mechanisms combined with various forms of financial compensation to 
individual terrorists and their families. The Indonesian police, specifically Det 88, 
financially assist the families of jihadists actively participating in the deradicalization 
program by paying school fees, providing money for food and clothing, providing start-
up money upon release from prison, buying plane tickets for family members to see 
detained program candidates, granting visitation for family members, and facilitating 
marriage and medical care for prisoners (Schulze, 2008; Istiqomah, 2011, p. 30). Det 88 
creates job opportunities by giving microloans/start-up funds for businesses with the 
intention of providing former terrorists with a “meaningful occupation” (Ranstorp, 2009, 
p. 8). Det 88 also facilitates job training through the work of Nasir Abas. He endeavors to 
build the vocational skills of jihadi prisoners which, in turn, allow them to more fully 
integrate back into their community upon their release from prison (Istiqomah, 2011, 
p. 30). 
Experts recognize that Det 88 provides these various forms of selective 
incentives as little more than financial pacification done to moderate individual behavior 
(Ranstorp, 2009, p. 19). These socio-economic approaches often work, but must be tailor-
made to link individual needs to personal, time-consuming bonds made between 
prisoners and police officers (ICG, 2007, p. 13). As a means of achieving temporary 
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disengagement through instant gratification, Det 88’s use of selective incentives achieves 
its desired effects. The fact that, since 2007, JI has only launched two notable terrorist 
attacks suggests that the utilization of selective incentives by Det 88 has clearly been 
effective.  
b. Social Network 
This mechanism can best be identified through the work of Nasir Abas and 
Ali Imron. Abas’s message is more about means than ends. He does not attempt to 
change JI’s strategic vision of an Islamic state, but uses the life and sayings of 
Muhammad to tell JI members that the creation of an Islamic state should not be their 
priority (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 113). Although they relate to individual ideological re-
education, Ali Imron’s arguments should instead be viewed as individual disengagement 
because they aim to change jihadist behavior. The reasons are simple—Ali Imron’s 
version of re-education does not admonish or refute jihad, but rather modifies it. For Ali 
Imron, JI’s views regarding jihad are correct; the modification of these views pertains to 
the timing of offensive jihad, as well as an improved way to calculate the associated costs 
and benefits of terrorist attacks (ICG, 2007, pp. 12–13). What is significant about the 
approaches of Abas and Imron is the fact that they seek to modify jihadist beliefs just 
enough to allow the individual to temporary disengage from terrorist violence. Their style 
can be interpreted as pragmatic and realistic in pursuit of achieving the immediate effect 
of individual disengagement. 
The Indonesian contextualized environment presents unique challenges 
because “in the mind of the radicals, all ulama have already failed because they failed to 
establish an Islamic state…their credibility is nothing with the militants” (Schulze, 2008). 
Recognizing this, Indonesian deradicalization practitioners believe that reformed 
terrorists may make significant strides toward deradicalization because they share a 
common identity with jihadi militants, and thus command a tremendous amount of 
respect. By using jihadist-based social networks as a powerfully influential 
disengagement tool, Det 88 is able to speak to radical jihadist through ways in which they 
could understand and relate. What these ex-militants lack in religious knowledge they 
69 
 
made up for in terms of credibility and charisma, as they directly relate to other prisoners 
of whom they had personally recruited or trained (Neumann, 2010, p. 52). 
c. Arrest 
Since the first Bali bombing in 2002, Indonesian security forces have 
arrested more than 400 JI terrorists and active supporters. Despite a poor rule of law 
across the country, these arrests have been backed by a high terrorist conviction rate. 
These convictions have led to JI being “fundamentally compromised and disrupted,” 
(Sheridan, 2008) as evidenced by the last major JI attack being the second Bali bombing 
in 2005. The arrest mechanism works because it physically prevents terrorists from 
participating in future acts of violence while maintaining pressure on active terror cells 
within the group. Sixty-two jihadi prisoners were released from Indonesian prisons 
between 2006–2007, of which thirty-one were JI members (ICG, 2007, pp. 24–25). This 
action resembles a “revolving door” for jailed jihadists operating in Indonesia—proving 
that although Det 88 arrests terrorists, these same individuals may inevitably receive a 
more lenient punishment through early release from prison. This interesting dynamic 
suggests that large scale detainee release could be counterproductive to, if not completely 
undermine, the arrest mechanism.  
2. Collective Disengagement 
Regarding the collective disengagement LOE, two mechanisms embody the Det 
88 program—social networks and environmental manipulation. Adding to what was 
described in the previous LOE, the credibility and perceived legitimacy felt within jihadi 
social networks provide effects that are conducive to terrorist disengagement at the 
group-level. The potential for environmental manipulation can be observed within the 
Indonesian prison system as well. Recent historical events and ongoing policies place 
Indonesian prisons in an advantageous position to enhance collective disengagement 





relate to this LOE. This case study shows that massive amounts of state repression may 
very well lead to political inclusion, which, in turn, relates to the decision by the group to 
disengage from terrorism.  
a. Social Network 
Pragmatically speaking, the social network tied to the Det 88 program has 
been successful in eliciting information that has led to the disruption of the JI terrorist 
network in Indonesia. To this day, a number of individuals continue to privately 
cooperate with the police to disengage pockets of militants from the network (Rabasa et 
al., 2010, p. 109). This statement assumes that the impetus behind the Det 88 is first and 
foremost disengagement, with deradicalization serving as an enhancing, but not an 
essential, component. 
The Indonesian government enabled the JI organization to collectively 
disengage itself. Det 88 identified that JI had developed a strong internal social network. 
Recognizing this, Det 88 applied the state repression mechanism against the group. As a 
result, in August 2009, Ba’asyir announced that armed struggle against the U.S. is a 
religious obligation for the international Muslim community, but Indonesia’s brand of 
jihad should consist of proselytization until further notice (Woodward et al., 2010, p. 9). 
In effect, he called for JI to suspend terrorist activities within Indonesia indefinitely; this 
announcement should be considered as the single-most important element of collective 
disengagement thus far in Indonesia. Also, a lack of factionalization within the JI 
organization following Ba’asyir’s announcement demonstrates not only group solidarity, 
but also signifies the strength of the JI internal social network. 
b. Environmental Manipulation 
This mechanism indirectly occurs throughout the Indonesian law 
enforcement and prison systems. It primarily results from prisoner interaction rather than 
direct government action or involvement. At this point, the government essentially turns a 
“blind eye” to prison activities, but resides in a unique position to influence, shape, or 
control the overall prison environment. Both Detachment 88 and the Jakarta Center for 
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Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) have “major initiatives” (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 19) 
aimed at fortifying security at prisons to prevent terror cells from originating and the 
radicalization of other inmates. Although these major initiatives are descriptively vague 
with limited public disclosure, they have the potential to contribute to collective 
disengagement. In addition, recent empirical data states that criminal gangs like Gang 
Arek and Gang Korea have physically confronted the jihadi-based Ustadz Gang over 
prestige and “turf” (ICG, 2007, p. 5).   
c. State Repression 
The operational capacity of JI has been “severely crippled” (Oak, 2010, 
p. 1000) as a result of copious amounts of state repression, punctuated by 466 arrested JI 
members (roughly 23 percent of its organizational composition) and numerous raids and 
weapons cache confiscations since 2002 (Oak, 2010, p. 1000). One should remain 
skeptical of these actions, as state repression is very much a double-edged sword—while 
the immediate effects of eroding the target group are viewed as beneficial, the second and 
third-order effects are unknown and may very well lead to strategic problems that rival, if 
not surpass, the issues posed originally by the target group. 
d. Political Inclusion 
The unique political and social environment of Indonesia, facilitated by 
the government, may have created a window of opportunity for JI to take advantage of 
the political inclusion mechanism. Since its inception in 2000, Ba’asyir’s Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) political strategy has sought to unite jihadi and non-jihadi 
radical Islamists and lobby for political change in accordance with Sharia (Barton, 2008, 
p. 131). MMI serves as the forerunner to Jamaah Ansharud Tauhid (JAT), another 
political group founded by Ba’asyir in September 2008. These two organizations have 
influenced JI’s degree of militancy and violence. Arguably, MMI and JAT have led to 
JI’s transformation into a predominantly political movement with a limited threshold for 
violence. In short, JI’s political focus stymied its capacity to conduct significant acts of 
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terror and denigrated its activities to ideological proselytization and recruitment, which, 
in turn, greatly contributes to the ongoing collective disengagement of JI. 
3. Individual Deradicalization 
Indonesia’s success has been in part due to its emphasis on individual-level 
approaches. Recognizing that deradicalization is a “labor-intensive business,” (Sheridan, 
2008) it seeks to exploit information from a balanced mix of hard and soft power. The 
individual deradicalization LOE, as it applies to the Det 88 program, can best be 
expressed through the application of the re-education mechanism and two family-based 
mechanisms—family building and family responsibility. 
a. Re-education 
Without question, this mechanism has been the most visible component of 
individual deradicalization in Indonesia. JI sees the Indonesian government as 
“kafir…they are the enemy and all products from the government are haram” (Schulze, 
2008). Because of this, Det 88 has turned to former JI extremists like Nasir Abas and Ali 
Imron who have ideologically moderated. This technique is inherently powerful because 
these ex-militants have the requisite credibility needed to garner the trust and legitimacy 
from among the pool of potential deradicalization candidates (Sheridan, 2008). Because 
they share a common identity and worldview, the ability of ex-militants to moderate 
active jihadists cannot be underestimated; Det 88 and other Indonesian agencies 
recognize the importance of this mechanism and will leverage it to the fullest possible 
extent.   
Theological dialogue is absent from the Det 88 deradicalization 
methodology; rather, the Indonesian police rely on “cultural interrogation,” (Rabasa et 
al., 2010, p. 107) an approach that requires the interrogator to be immersed in the culture 
of the detainee, understand his emotional state of mind, and share a common language 
(Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 107).   
Nasir Abas’s approach retains two key elements of re-education: the 
killing of civilians and the need for an Islamic state. Abas asserts that JI’s struggles have 
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been corrupted by bombings against civilians. He attempts to show candidates that true 
ulama do not want an Islamic state within Indonesia (Schulze, 2008). Abas uses three 
arguments to convince militant jihadis to abandon their allegiance to the movement: 
(1) that militant jihad and attacking civilians is not in accordance with Islam, (2) that all 
Westerners are not bad, and (3) that militant Islam has done a great disservice to Islam by 
giving it a bad image in the eye of international public perception (Speckhard, 2011, 
p. 11–6). The Abas version of re-education has led to the successful deradicalization of 
twenty jihadi prisoners. While some experts and analysts consider this figure to be low 
and insignificant, one cannot deny that deradicalization via re-education has achieved 
some success in Indonesia. 
Former radical Islamist Noor Huda Ismail serves as another proponent of 
the re-education mechanism. His brand of re-education emphasizes the reintroduction of 
“normal” lifestyles and behavior. Indeed, Ismail’s mission in establishing and managing 
the Institute of International Peace Building seeks to give ex-militants a normal life, and 
in doing so, provides them with an opportunity to live peacefully and productively within 
mainstream society (Sabarini, 2010a). 
b. Family Building / Family Responsibility 
Family building can best be expressed through the ways in which Det 88 
assist the families of prisoners participating in the deradicalization program. This 
includes services such as paying school fees, providing money for food and clothing, 
providing start-up money upon release from prison, buying plane tickets for family 
members to see detained program candidates, granting visitation for family members, 
facilitating marriage and medical care for prisoners (Schulze, 2008; Istiqomah, 2011, 
p. 30). Det 88 also understands that JI operatives practice hijra, leaving their families and 
property to fight in the jihad (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 108). Recognizing this, Det 88 tries 
to place a greater emphasis on not only family building, but family responsibility as well, 
by flipping the hijra process around on jihadi prisoners and detainees, and leverage the 
cultural emphasis placed on family and the immediate, local community by reuniting 
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them with their families to facilitate deradicalization. It should be noted, however, that 
the immediate effect of these actions may result in disengagement.   
4. Collective Deradicalization 
Three mechanisms—social interaction with moderates, delegitimizing the 
group/violence, and political inclusion—comprise nearly all of the collective 
deradicalization LOE in Indonesia. What is fascinating about these mechanisms is the 
fact that none of them correspond to the deliberate activities of Det 88 or to actions 
conducted by the Indonesian government. Rather, they are the result of actions taken by 
social groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and formal political movements. 
While the government has no direct involvement in ongoing collective deradicalization 
activities, it remains indirectly linked to the effects of these mechanisms and the activities 
being performed by these third-party groups.  
a. Social Interaction with Moderates 
The Wahid and Maarif Institutes both attempt to openly challenge radical 
ideology in a public forum. The Wahid Institute actively and critically examines radical 
messages and uses information campaigns to encourage debate on strategically relevant 
issues. The Maarif Institute works to consolidate democracy in Indonesia by organizing 
open debates and discussions as a means of encouraging citizen involvement in the 
political process (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 7). In addition to these two organizations, the 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (‘Oneness in Diversity’) movement was created in May 2009 by 
key political and social leaders that aimed to organize members of the Indonesian elite to 
“actively prevent the spread of radical Islam on all levels and with all available means” 
(Ranstorp, 2009, p. 17). While its intentions are pure and wholesome, the movement can 
also be criticized as generating a polarizing effect of “us versus them” across Indonesian 
society. It is also difficult to measure the aggregate effect generated by these moderate 
groups because its levels of effectiveness among the Indonesian population is nearly 
impossible to capture. 
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b. Delegitimizing the Group / Delegitimizing Violence 
There exist several ways in which groups have attempted to delegitimize 
JI as a terrorist group, as well as delegitimize its violent methods. Interfaith dialogue 
serves as a tool to increase international collaboration and respect between cultural and 
religious groups. The dialogue helps to counteract terrorism and radicalization from a 
long-term perspective and strategically employs dominant and widely-accepted religious 
views such as acceptance, tolerance, and moderation (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 9). The overall 
utility of this dialogue remains undetermined and may in fact lead to more conflict as 
opposed to less of it. JI can also be delegitimized through the promotion and expansion of 
democracy. Two recent examples highlighting the ideological expansion of democracy 
include Muhammidiyah’s decision to ban external activities/influence that were “against 
the spirit of democracy,” (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 16) and Nahdlatul Ulama’s official decree 
stating that Muslims are not “theologically required to establish a khalifa or oppose 
democracy” (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 16). Lastly, a repentant Ali Imron continues to preach a 
nonviolent interpretation of jihad as a spiritual struggle in God’s name and in doing so, 
delegitimizes the use of violence as well as those who espouse it (Rabasa et al., 2010, 
p. 114). 
c. Political Inclusion 
This mechanism could have a transformative effect on the organization 
that ultimately leads to collective deradicalization. Research indicates that JI has 
contacted political and socially accepted organizations like the Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) (Oak, 2010, p. 999). To date 
there are no indications that the government has impeded JI’s attempt to become 
politically active through its interaction with these two organizations. These groups may 
guide JI’s organizational evolution by creating greater appeal for a peaceful 
transformation to a legitimate political entity (Oak, 2010, p. 999).   
Given these recent events, it is entirely conceivable that JI transitions to a 
legitimate political and social organization within Indonesia in similar fashion to the 
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Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB). While JI’s operational strength has diminished, its 
extensive social networks remain intact. Such a transformation would have a tremendous 
impact on the Indonesian radical Islamic community in a positive manner by 
demonstrating that political struggle serves as a viable alternative to violence. This option 
should be viewed as extremely viable since many components of the MB model have 
been reflected in JI strategies and missions (Oak, 2010, p. 1005). 
 
Figure 5.   Indonesia’s Effectiveness 
Figure 5 aptly depicts the overall shape of the Det 88 deradicalization program 
and highlights three distinct characteristics, the first of which being a large amount of 
emphasis placed on disengagement at the individual and collective levels. Figure 5 
clearly shows that, with regard to the overall effectiveness of the program, Det 88 has 
made the most progress at disengagement; this is due in large part to the manner in which 
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Det 88 implemented two critical mechanisms:  selective incentives and social networks. 
The various forms of material compensation provided by Det 88 facilitated the individual 
disengagement of numerous JI members. The ways in which Det 88 leverages its organic 
social network and influences JI’s internal social networks also achieves a desired net 
effect of disengagement at both the individual and collective levels. 
The second distinctive feature shown by Figure 5 is its abundance of effectiveness 
within the individual deradicalization and individual disengagement LOEs. Like the 
disengagement portion of Figure 5, its entire left side displays the large amount of 
programmatic effectiveness at the individual level of analysis. The previous paragraph 
discusses the relevance of selective incentives and social networks within the individual 
disengagement LOE. Within the individual deradicalization LOE, the re-education 
mechanism has clearly played the greatest role. The work of ex-militants Nasir Abas and 
Ali Imron have directly contributed to the successful deradicalization of individual JI 
terrorists. 
Figure 5’s third major characteristic is the relative absence of effectiveness within 
the collective deradicalization LOE. To date, Det 88 has yet to implement any programs 
designated for the collective deradicalization of terrorist organizations such as JI. Within 
Indonesia, all attempts to collectively deradicalize JI have been undertaken by third-party 
political and/or social groups which are not formally aligned with the Indonesian 
government. The reasons for Det 88’s lack of effort within this LOE are unclear, but may 
relate to a general recognition that collective deradicalization, at this point, is simply 
unattainable for Det 88 given its finite organizational resources and operational capacity.   
C. OUTCOME 
The various mechanisms implemented by the Det 88 program have led to the 
pragmatic disengagement of JI. Ashour’s definition of pragmatic deradicalization, when 
applied to the concept of disengagement, suggests that pragmatic disengagement results 
from the successful behavioral and organizational disengagement process of the group, 
but without the much-needed ideological component that delegitimizes violence (Ashour, 
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2009, p. 6). The most telling and easily identified empirical data supporting this assertion 
is Ba’asyir’s 2009 proclamation for JI to temporarily suspend terrorist violence 
indefinitely and instead focus on organizational recruitment and religious proselytization. 
Another significant piece of empirical data that supports the pragmatic disengagement 
categorization of JI is the addition and inclusion of JAT and MMI as the recognized 
political wings of JI. As JI engages with well-established political and social groups like 
PKS and DDII, it may seek to formally align itself with these groups. Such an alignment 
will likely have a more profound, lasting effect on the pragmatic disengagement process 
of JI, and further enhance JI’s potential for collective deradicalization. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Indonesian deradicalization program has relied mostly on individual initiative 
of Detachment 88, an organization with constrained capability and a finite amount of 
resources (Neumann, 2010, p. 50). Given the analysis contained in the four LOEs, two 
dominant, recurring themes present themselves. First, the empirical data clearly signifies 
that the Det 88 program should be categorized as a disengagement campaign rather than a 
deradicalization campaign. While the data implies that a small number of jihadists were 
deradicalized by ex-militants like Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, the deradicalization process 
should be treated more like an accidental by-product of the Det 88 strategic vision—
influence jihadist behavior so as to prevent future terror attacks. The other dominant 
theme, as shown in the aforementioned analysis, is the individual level of analysis 
emphasized by the Det 88 program. Arguably, the most meaningful results of the Det 88 
program can be observed by looking at two LOEs—individual disengagement and 
individual deradicalization. One cannot deny that efforts toward collective disengagement 
and deradicalization have taken place in Indonesia, but these efforts have mostly been 
undertaken by JI itself or by external, third-party social organizations and NGOs rather 
than by Det 88 and the government of Indonesia.  
How should a befitting deradicalization campaign be crafted in Indonesia?  Few 
experts have attempted to establish a comprehensive strategy or campaign that seeks to 
moderate the virulent ideology of radical jihadist groups in Indonesia. Some experts and 
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research think tanks assert that deradicalization and rehabilitation programs should 
primarily focus on reforming individual terrorists rather than terrorist groups 
(International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 16). As such, it is imperative that individual-level 
efforts are not cookie-cutter, but rather nuanced and crafted to address the needs of the 
individual terrorist. A recently published International Crisis Group report (2012) 
provides a list of recommendations to the Indonesian government on how to prevent the 
spread of radical ideology (counter-radicalization). Interestingly enough, none of these 
recommendations attempt to prescribe effective options for dealing with jihadists 
currently being detained in the Indonesian prison system or those jihadists that continue 
to operate and freely move about Indonesian society. 
It is important to realize that all hope for terrorist deradicalization is not lost in 
Indonesia, as two relatively new government initiatives seek to build off of the few 
successes experienced by the Detachment 88 program. Indonesia’s fledgling National 
Counterterrorism Agency stood up in 2010 and is charged with “implementing the 
government’s counter-radicalization and disengagement programs” (U.S. Department of 
State, 2012, p. 42). In May 2012, the Indonesian Defense Ministry stated its intent to 
work with local religious leaders and education experts “to develop a curriculum for its 
deradicalization center for convicted terrorists in Bogor, West Java” (Govt center aims to 
rehabilitate terrorists in Bogor, 2012). The goal of the center is to rehabilitate convicted 
terrorists through training and education that prepares them for release back into 
mainstream society (Govt center, 2012). Initial observations indicate that this is certainly 
a step in the right direction for the Indonesian government. Finally, it appears as if the 
Indonesian brand of terrorist deradicalization will now be coordinated, resourced, and 
sponsored by the national government. Only time and local circumstances will determine 
the effectiveness of this rejuvenated deradicalization effort in Indonesia.    
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As illustrated in the previous case studies, states employ a variety of mechanisms 
within the four primary LOEs. The strategic vision and desired end-state for a 
deradicalization campaign ultimately determines the amount of effort and emphasis 
placed on any given mechanism and LOE. For a complete breakdown of individual 
mechanisms, by case, refer to Appendix B (States’ Efforts by Mechanism). 
A. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Figure 6.   Comparative Overlay 
Three distinct observations can be made from Figure 6. First, the most effective 
LOE varied in each case. This may be attributable to the application of resources into a 
specific LOE or to the fact that mechanisms may be more or less effective in different 
contextual environments. Second, collective disengagement was almost equally effective 
in each case. Appendix B, Table 2 suggests that this may be due to the amount of effort 
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shown by each state within the specific LOE mechanisms; this may stem from the ease of 
execution for these types of mechanisms. Third, the individual disengagement LOE was 
relatively equal in three of the four countries, the exception being Indonesia. This 
equality may relate to the fact that individual disengagement mechanisms are 
comparatively less resource intensive and produce more short term tangible results.   
1. Collective Efforts are More Effective   
As previously discussed, current radicalization literature emphasizes the 
importance of collective identity. The case study analyses show that collective efforts 
have the greatest effect. Mechanisms that facilitate collective deradicalization carry more 
weight because they target group/social factors that bind individuals together. Algeria and 
Yemen used more collective mechanisms than Saudi or Indonesia and each had higher 
ranking deradicalization effectiveness. Indonesia had the least evidence of collective 
mechanisms and its primary terrorist organization internally disengaged in order to 
reconstitute its ability to fight again in the future, a clear indication that radical thinking 
remains. Conversely, Algeria had the most evidence of collective mechanisms and its 
primary terrorist organizations have converted to the political process to seek desired 
changes, which suggests they no longer embrace violence as legitimate means. 
2. Individual Efforts Trump Collective  
The individual level generally trumps the collective level with regard to the 
amount of effort put forth by the state within a given deradicalization campaign. In terms 
of the individual disengagement LOE, Appendix B shows that the capture or kill 
mechanism was the most heavily emphasized activity implemented in Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, and Indonesia. Four other mechanisms—job opportunities, job training, social 
networks, and detainee release—were used to a lesser degree in at least two of the four 
cases. What is interesting about these mechanisms is the fact they all seek to moderate 
violent behavior of the individual terrorist through immediate gratification and material 
compensation. These mechanisms, in effect, allow the state to tangibly influence 
individuals to stray from violent terrorist activities. Also, these mechanisms logically 
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support the notion that an attrition strategy undertaken by the state can slowly degrade the 
operational capability within a targeted terrorist group. 
Appendix B also shows that the individual deradicalization LOE is more 
vigorously used by a greater number of states than the collective deradicalization LOE. 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Indonesia all incorporated the re-education, family building, 
and family/community responsibility mechanisms within the individual deradicalization 
LOE. The only collective deradicalization mechanism common to all three countries was 
delegitimize violence. While it remains difficult to ascertain the efficacy of these 
mechanisms, the analysis shown throughout this research suggests that states are more 
likely to focus on individual deradicalization action vice collective deradicalization 
action. In similar fashion to comments made in the preceding paragraph, states recognize 
that individual deradicalization efforts are more responsive, more immediately observed, 
and arguably less resource intensive than collective deradicalization efforts. Simply put, 
states have a greater ability to control the desired outcome(s) of the two individual LOEs 
than the two collective LOEs. 
3. Disengagement Supersedes Deradicalization  
The third significant observation shown by Figure 6 suggests that disengagement 
efforts generally supersede deradicalization efforts within a state-run terrorist 
deradicalization campaign. Appendix B shows that, at the individual and collective 
levels, the disengagement and deradicalization LOEs each contain twenty mechanisms. 
Further investigation shows that, of the four studies used in this research, thirteen 
disengagement mechanisms were used in two or more cases while only six 
deradicalization mechanisms were used in the same number of cases. Thus, almost two 
thirds of the disengagement mechanisms were implemented by two or more states, while 
only one third of the deradicalization mechanisms were used by two or more cases. These 
observations suggest, from a strategic viewpoint, an agenda predicated upon 
disengagement carries more utility than an agenda built around deradicalization efforts. 
These observations also match conventional wisdom in that disengagement is a more 
pragmatic and feasible endeavor than deradicalization.   
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4. Collective Deradicalization is Generally Avoided  
Collective deradicalization is generally avoided when implementing a state-run 
campaign. This is a surprising dynamic considering the amount of literature that 
highlights the importance of collective identity. The difficulty with mechanisms in this 
category is that they do not yield the immediate results that states desire. With the 
exception of the Algerian case, collective deradicalization was the least used LOE. 
Mechanisms such as state repression yield more tangible results such as dead or 
imprisoned terrorists. Tangible results provide governments something to show their 
constituencies. It is almost trite to point out that human thought and beliefs are 
significantly more complex than human behavior. As long as that dynamic prevails then 
changing human thoughts will be a more difficult task than changing behavior. 
Consequently, governments in need of more immediate results will most likely favor 
disengagement LOEs.           
B. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
1. Deradicalization in Name Only    
As shown in the four aforementioned cases, the four associated campaigns should 
be categorized as “deradicalization” in name only. These campaigns are labeled 
deradicalization because this word captures the essence of utilizing soft approaches 
within the context of a broader counterterrorism strategy. The reality is that in many 
situations states do not have the time or patience to implement true deradicalization 
mechanisms and wait for the results, which are time consuming, hard to accurately 
measure, and difficult to observe. The soft approaches that comprise a deradicalization 
campaign often serve as a more socially acceptable compliment to hard counterterrorism 
approaches synonymous with state repression. States can justify the further use of hard 
approaches and potentially increase their effectiveness by including a contextualized 
blend of mechanisms contained within the four LOEs.   
Additionally, the manner in which a state implements a mechanism may reveal its 
true deradicalization intentions. A good example of this can be determined from 
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leadership targeting. If a state primarily focuses on targeting the leaders, specifically 
killing, this may indicate that a state may only be concerned with the cessation of 
violence or disengagement. Whereas a state who refrains from targeting the leaders and 
utilizes non-kinetic methods to engage with leaders, this may indicate a higher degree of 
interest in actually wanting deradicalization. In Saudi Arabia, the government kinetically 
targeted the leaders of AQAP as did Yemen with AAA, SBY, AQY, and still does with 
AQAP. In these examples collective disengagement was the result. However, in Algeria 
with AIS and in Yemen with IJY, non-kinetic methods were used to engage the leaders, 
which resulted in varying degrees of deradicalization. 
2. Importance of Leadership 
The four case studies have highlighted and reinforced the claim that radical 
groups’ leaders are a key component in a state’s deradicalization campaign. Ashour 
(2009) and Johnston (2012) both agree on the importance of leaders and the need for 
states to engage leaders in some fashion. They disagree, however, on the method of 
engagement. Ashour suggests that leaders who are charismatic need to be present in order 
to facilitate states’ efforts at deradicalization (Ashour, 2009, p. 15). Johnston, on the other 
hand, advances the idea that leaders need to be removed from the group in order to bring 
about their defeat (Johnston, 2012, p. 77). Despite the difference, all three points have 
been identified within the case studies: the importance of leaders, the presence of leaders 
is needed for deradicalization, and the removal of leaders is needed for collective 
disengagement.  
In Saudi Arabia, one of the key ingredients in bringing about the defeat of AQAP 
was the targeting of its leaders. Targeting the leadership, specifically killing, resulted in 
the successive elimination of strong charismatic leaders within the group. Without real 
leadership the group was off-balance and disrupted in its ability to conduct attacks. 
Though not the sole factor for bringing about the defeat of AQAP, targeting AQAP 
leaders did play a dominant role.  
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In Yemen, targeting of leaders carried a much more direct effect. With AAA, 
AQY, and SBY the removal or elimination of the leaders effectively brought about the 
end of these groups within Yemen. Following the execution of al-Midhar in October 
1999, AAA essentially fell apart. AQY ended with Yemeni security forces killing al-
Harithi in November 2002 and capturing al-Ahdal in November 2003. Finally, SBY 
ceased when government forces in Yemen killed al-Qu’ayti in 2008.  
In Algeria, an Army General went and negotiated with the leader of AIS. The 
General worked through Medani Mezraq instead of attempting to remove him. By 
working through the leader, who was well respected, the General was able to facilitate the 
deradicalization of AIS and several subordinate groups of other terrorist organizations. In 
other cases, such as GIA and GSPC, the government kinetically targeted the leaders in 
order to decapitate the organizations. The efforts were partially effective but the groups 
eventually spawned into AQIM, the Muslim insurgency that currently plagues all of 
North Africa.  
In the case of IJY, former President Salih co-opted the leaders, al-Fadhli and al-
Nahdi, to bring an end to IJY. By influencing and co-opting these leaders with plenty of 
selective incentives, Yemen facilitated a degree of deradicalization with the IJY. Without 
the presence of the leaders, Yemen would not have been able to facilitate 
deradicalization.  
3. Context Matters 
Our case study analyses indicate that there is no magic combination that can be 
internationally applied. The optimal combination depends heavily on the local factors. 
The optimal combination of hard and soft approaches varies from country to country 
based on the situation and the unique internal environment. Within the field of soft 
approaches, “Deradicalization pathways [are] likely to be affected by the political-
economic and sociocultural context in which the individual and group are nested” (Davis 
& Craigan, 2010, p. 367). In Yemen and Algeria the timing of the soft approaches was 
important in achieving their desired effects. In both cases, mechanisms such as 
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negotiations were used after hard approaches had led terrorist groups to a strategic 
crisis.17  The atrocities in Algeria were so severe that some groups were simply 
exhausted. In Yemen, the state used political inclusion with IJY in conjunction with 
kinetic targeting.   
4. Collective Identity Matters 
The Radicalization section of Chapter I provides a succinct discussion on the 
conceptual relevance of collective identity and the critical role it has on the process of 
terrorist radicalization at the individual and collective level. Regarding the notion of 
deradicalization, collective identity can be influenced by two primary components—
family ties and social networks. The cases of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia suggest that, 
when states attempt to identify, influence, leverage, and/or control existing terrorist social 
networks via deradicalization mechanisms, the ensuing effects tend to favorably benefit 
the state. Conversely, states that either ignore or discount the importance of leveraging 
social networks within a given campaign are disadvantaged and lack a major weapon 
used in the struggle against terrorism and radical ideology. Arguably, such is the case in 
Yemen. The extent to which collective identity factors into a state-run deradicalization 
campaign remains purely contextual. One thing, however, appears certain—the idea of 
collective identity should be directly linked to an organized terrorist deradicalization 
program or campaign. 
C. FUTURE OF DERADICALIZATION 
1. Existing Proposal 
Recently, deradicalization experts have suggested some rather abstract ideas 
surrounding of concept of a “global regime” (Gunaratna, 2009, p. 159) aimed at terrorist 
rehabilitation and deradicalization. Gunaratna (2009) argues for the formation of an 
international terrorist rehabilitation governing body predicated upon the following six 
common programs: (1) a common database or repository of information; (2) exchange of 
                                                 
17 According to Rebasa et al. (2010) the definition of a strategic crisis is “a re-examination of a 
group’s methods due to state repression.” (p. 161) 
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technical/professional personnel so as to improve information collaboration and capacity 
building; (3) joint research, publication, education, and training tied to terrorist 
rehabilitation; (4) transfer of expertise and resources to create resource parity within the 
international community; (5) sharing of experience and disseminating lessons learned 
from previous and current programs; and (6) establishing an international advisory 
council consisting of practitioners and scholars (pp. 160–161).   
While Gunaratna’s suggested programs appear to be logical and theoretically 
sound, they have little practical applicability for several key reasons. First, international 
organizations tend to be wholly ineffective and bureaucratically inefficient. Common 
sense suggests that large international organizations face significant challenges when 
determining how to properly act upon policy. Secondly, terrorist deradicalization thus far 
has proven to be an entirely local/domestic phenomenon. As such, states tend to 
exclusively use domestic forms of governance and power to deal with terrorism. Lastly, 
terrorist deradicalization and rehabilitation programs are relatively new, having provided 
extremely limited amounts of data and research. Realistically, it will take many more 
years to produce and analyze the amount of data required to adequately assemble a global 
advisory council.   
2. Our Recommendations 
Ashour (2009) and Rabasa et al. (2010) identified that deradicalization efforts 
must have both hard and soft approaches. Our research generally concurs with the 
assessments contained in these two references. State repression alone, for example, is not 
enough. Additionally, incentives without some level of repression will not work either. 
States must find a balance between the hard and soft approaches that fit the specific 
context of their particular country.   
States must ensure that their deradicalization campaign efforts include 
mechanisms that engage the leaders of the groups. More importantly, if states truly aim to 




leaders. The states need to find ways to influence or co-opt him while he actively controls 
the group or once he is captured, but still has influence. Without the leader available 
(dead), deradicalization will not occur.   
3. Future Research 
The authors recognize several limitations of this research. First, only four case 
studies were conducted and each was deliberately selected from a pool of Muslim 
majority countries dealing with religiously affiliated terrorist organizations. The 
conclusions presented could be further bolstered or disproved if tested against states 
efforts against organizations within other terrorism typologies (such as anarchists, 
separatists, or leftist). Second, the list of mechanisms found in Appendix A is not 
exhaustive. Future research could further refine the mechanisms used and possibly 
identify more mechanisms. Our framework categorized certain mechanisms into LOEs, 
but the mode of implication should be the ultimate factor that determines which LOE the 
mechanism falls under. Finally, several of these cases represent ongoing problems. 
Deradicalization is a long process that may only reveal results decades after a campaign 
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APPENDIX A. LOE MECHANISMS DEFINED 
INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT 
• Arrest—incarcerate an individual, physically preventing him from 
committing acts of violence against the state. 
• Kill—the individual is deceased and physically unable to commit acts of 
violence against the state. 
• Marriage—a union between a man and a woman where the union places 
increased responsibilities and duties upon the man (militant) in order to 
preclude him from engaging in violent acts.  
• Job opportunities—a state providing employment to a militant in order to 
place increased responsibility upon him and preclude him from engaging 
in violent acts. 
• Job training—the state providing skills training in order to further prepare 
the individual for a potential job opportunity.  
• Protection from terrorist group reprisal—a state’s efforts to provide 
security to those individuals who leave extremist organization and or 
speak out against the group 
• Detainee release—a state’s release of individuals from incarceration under 
the agreement that the individuals will not commit acts of violence. If the 
individuals do commit acts of violence against the state they will be re-
arrested. 
• Social network—state’s effort to change whom the individual “hangs out” 






• Political inclusion—allow the group to become full and legitimate 
members involved in the formal political process and institutions of the 
state. 
• Establishing autonomous zone—partitioning a semi and or fully 
autonomous area in which the group governs the territory and its 
inhabitants. Here the group is focused on governing its territory vice 
attacks against the state. 
• High-profile detainee release—the release from incarceration of high-
ranking members of the opposition organization in order to effect 
disengagement of the group. The state’s action is directed at the newly 
released individual, but the desired effect is aimed at the group. 
• Target key leaders—direct action (capture/kill) operations against the 
group leader(ship) with a goal of having a coercive effect aimed at group 
disengagement. This includes operational leaders as well as key religious 
figures of the group. 
• State repression—any active, offensive military, and or police action 
against the group, or supporters of the group 
• Environmental manipulation—an act taken by the state to specifically 
control a clearly defined element within the local environment.  
 
INDIVIDUAL DERADICALIZATION 
• Marriage—a union between a man and a woman where the union places 
increased responsibilities and duties upon the man (militant) in order to 
preclude him from engaging in violent acts. In this instance, 
deradicalization comes from long-term disengagement where the 
individual values his family over the belief in violence. 
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• Family building—a state’s efforts to strengthen an individual’s ties to his 
family in order to promote the family’s increased interest in preventing the 
individual from committing further acts of violence. 
• Family/tribal/community responsibility—the state specifically placing 
responsibility for the formerly violent individual on the family, tribe, and 
or community for integration. The goal of the state is to affect the 
individual, not the group 
• Re-education—a state’s efforts to re-teach the correct or socially accepted 
religious beliefs within the state to the individual 
 
COLLECTIVE DERADICALIZATION: 
• Social interaction with moderates—a state’s efforts to use legitimate, well 
respected, and moderate clerics to interact and influence the thought of the 
group itself. 
• Influence or co-opt the leader(s)—a state’s efforts to change the group’s 
leader’s belief in the use of violence, ideally leading to the leader 
renouncing violence and facilitating the deradicalization of the group. 
• Delegitimize the leader—state’s effort to reduce the credibility of the 
leadership in order to change the beliefs of the group members and cause a 
reduction in membership. An example of leader de-legitimation is an 
effective, specific state-run media smear campaign. 
• Establishing autonomous zone—partitioning a semi and or fully 
autonomous area in which the group governs the territory and its 
inhabitants.  
• Political inclusion—allow the group to become full and legitimate 








APPENDIX B. STATES’ EFFORTS BY MECHANISM 
The following tables show each state’s efforts within the four LOEs, which is 
further broken down by mechanism. This allows for a comparison between states of the 
effort used by mechanism across LOEs. The scale used is from zero (0) to three (3). Zero 
(0) is no effort or the mechanism not used. This category is color coded in white. One (1) 
is minimal effort and color coded in light gray. Two (2) refers to moderate effort. Two is 




Arabia Yemen Indonesia 
 
Protection from Terrorist Group 
Reprisal 2 0 0 0 
 
Isolation if Prison Facilities 1 0 0 0 
 
Capture or Kill 0 3 3 0 
 
Promote Marriage 0 2 1 0 
 
Provide Job Opportunities 2 2 1 0 
 
Provide Job Training 0 2 0 0 
 
Social Networks 0 2 0 2 
 
Detainee Release 0 2 1 0 
 
Publication of Militants’ Names 0 3 1 0 
 
Disengagement of Community 
Leaders 0 2 0 0 
 
Selective Incentives 0 0 0 3 
 
Arrest/Detainee Release 0 0 0 3 





Arabia Yemen Indonesia 
 
Environmental Manipulation 
3 1 0 2 
 
State Repression 
3 3 3 3 
 
Targeting Leadership 
2 3 3 0 
 
Social Networks 
1 0 0 3 
 
Negotiations 
0 0 0 0 
 Non-Aggression Pact 
0 0 2 0 
 
Amnesty 
0 2 1 0 
 
 Surrender 
0 2 1 0 
 
Political Inclusion 
0 0 2 1 
Table 2.   States’ Efforts in Collective Disengagement by Mechanism 
 Algeria 
Saudi 
Arabia Yemen Indonesia 
Re-education 
0 3 1 3 
Family Building 
0 2 1 2 
Family/Community 
Responsibility 
0 2 1 2 
Removal of Community Leaders 
1 0 0 0 
Delegitimize Violence 
2 0 0 0 







Arabia Yemen Indonesia 
Social Interaction with Moderates 
2 0 0 1 
Amnesty 
3 0 0 0 
Prisoner Release 
3 0 0 0 
Government Clean up 
2 0 0 0 
Apology 
1 0 0 0 
Re-Education 
1 0 0 0 
Religious Moderation 
1 0 0 0 
Negotiations 
3 0 1 0 
Delegitimize Religious Leaders 
0 2 0 0 
Environmental Manipulation 
0 1 0 0 
Delegitimize Violence 
0 3 2 1 
Delegitimize the Group 
0 3 0 1 
Influence or Co-opt Leadership 
0 0 2 0 
Political Inclusion 
0 0 0 0 
Table 4.   States’ Efforts in Collective Deradicalization by Mechanism 
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